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ARTICLES
THE SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE:
AN AMERICAN-CATHOLIC PERSPECTIVE
Daniel J. Morrissey*
I believe in an America where the separation of church and
state is absolute.
John F. Kennedy
Those who say that religion has nothing to do with politics do
not know what religion means.
Mohandas K. Gandhi2
1. INTRODUCTION: GROUNDING A CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE
ABOUT RELIGION
Much is said today of the need for a theory about religion and gov-
ernment that is true to the unique vision of our Constitution.3 Many find
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ida. A.B., 1971, Georgetown University, J.D., 1974, Georgetown University. The author
would like to thank Monsignor Franklyn Casale, Father Andrew Anderson, Jay Silver,
Siegfried Wiessner, Ray Rufo, Frank Sicius, Gilbert Gaynor, Jack McNeill, and student
Nancy Campiglia for their helpful comments.
This article is dedicated to Mary Beth Minor Morrissey, a dear friend and loving wife.
1. John F. Kennedy, Remarks on Church and State, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1960, at
22, reprinted in CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICAN HISTORY 190 (John F. Wilson &
Donald L. Drakeman eds., 2d ed. 1987) [hereinafter CHURCH AND STATE]. Kennedy de-
livered those remarks during the 1960 presidential campaign before a convention of Bap-
tist ministers in Houston.
2. MOHANDAS K. GANDHI, THE WORDS OF GANDHI 76 (Richard Attenborough
ed., 1982). As a contemporary jurist has put it:
We cannot divide the central ideas of a religion into two columns: a set of propo-
sitions about what reality ultimately is and a series of doctrines about how people
ought to live. The point is that the call to live in a certain way is felt to be the di-
rect implication of the world's being a certain way. ... [I]deas about, say, the re-
lationship of human will to divine grace, represent, simultaneously and insepara-
bly, visions of reality and imperatives of life.
ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, SOCIAL THEORY: ITS SITUATION AND ITS TASK 42
(1987).
3. As one distinguished commentator in this area has explained: "almost everyone,
including most of the present membership of the Supreme Court, is dissatisfied with the
current state of constitutional law regarding church and state." Steven G. Gey, Why is
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the Supreme Court's opinions in this area unclear and unconvincing.
Others question whether such a project is even possible Great divisions
Religion Special?: Reconsidering the Accommodation of Religion under the Religion
Clauses of the First Amendment, 52 U. PITT. L. REV. 75, 75 (1990); see also Gerard V'.
Bradley, Imagining the Past and Remembering the Future: The Supreme Court's History of
the Establishment Clause, 18 CONN. L. REV. 827, 829-30 (1986) (arguing that the Supreme
Court's inconsistent interpretation of the First Amendment's Establishment Clause indi-
cates that the Supreme Court's doctrine may not be a workable application of the First
Amendment to the "reality" of American society); Mark E. Chopko, Intentional Values
and the Public Interest-A Plea For Consistency in Church/State Relations, 39 DEPAUL L.
REV. 1143, 1145 (1990) (noting that the courts and legislatures have not provided a
framework for analyzing the interaction of religion and government); Robert A. Destro,
The Structure of the Religious Liberty Guarantee, 11 J.L. & RELIGION 355, 371-72 (1994-
95) (discussing the different interpretations of the role of the First Amendment's Religion
Clauses under a separation of powers analysis); Mary Ann Glendon & Raul F. Yanes,
Structural Free Exercise, 90 MICH. L. REV. 477, 518-19 (1991) (noting a new but not com-
pletely defined Supreme Court trend of affording deference to the legislature in First
Amendment Religion Clause cases); Mark Tushnet, The Constitution of Religion, 18
CONN. L. REV. 701, 701-02 (1986) (noting the "ignorance" and "disarray" of Religion
Clause jurisprudence).
4. In 1982 Stephen Pepper described the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on religion
as being "in significant disarray." Stephen L. Pepper, The Conundrum of the Free Exercise
Clause-Some Reflections on Recent Cases, 9 N. KY. L. REV. 265, 303 (1982). Since that
time, many other commentators have echoed that statement including, most recently, Jus-
tice Clarence Thomas. See infra note 175 and accompanying text; see also Carl H. Esbeck,
A Restatement of the Supreme Court's Law of Religious Freedom: Coherence, Conflict, or
Chaos?, 70 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 581, 613 (1995) (arguing that although many commen-
tators find the Supreme Court's Religion Clause jurisprudence chaotic, it is actually con-
sistent in result); Arnold H. Loewy, Rethinking Government Neutrality Towards Religion
Under the Establishment Clause: The Untapped Potential of Justice O'Connor's Insight, 64
N.C. L. REV. 1049, 1070 (1986) (discussing rationales for the Supreme Court's "muddled
inconsistency" in Religion Clause cases); William P. Marshall, "We Know It When We See
It" The Supreme Court and Establishment, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 495, 495-98 (1986) (noting
the lack of clarity in the Supreme Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence); Develop-
ments In The Law-Religion and The State, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1606, 1675 (1987) (noting
the "shift from 'separation of church and state' toward a policy of 'accommodation"' in the
Supreme Court's Religion Clause jurisprudence).
5. See STEVEN D. SMITH, FOREORDAINED FAILURE: THE QUEST FOR A
CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 60-71 (1995) (arguing that a
workable theory of religious freedom is impossible because of the number of differing
viewpoints in American society); cf Stanley Fish, Why We Can't All Just Get Along, FIRST
THINGS, Feb. 1996, at 18, 22-23 (examining the comments of scholars regarding the issue
of the interaction of government and religion under the First Amendment and arguing
that their approaches fail to address adequately the importance of the "religious im-
pulse").
Separation of Church and State
exist in our society on matters of politics and faith.6 It may be even
harder to reach any consensus on the more sweeping issue of how those
two spheres of human concern should interrelate.
But our jurisprudence on religion and government-what Jefferson
aptly called "the separation of Church and State" 7 -has not been created
out of whole cloth during the relatively short history of our republic. It
has evolved from an intellectual heritage stretching back several millen-
nia and turns on pivotal insights from such historical figures as Gelasius,
an early medieval pope, who may have been the first to' formally place
religious and political power in two separate realms.8 And like all consti-
tutional jurisprudence in our common law tradition, it depends as well on
the continuing efforts of human reason to discover some meaningful
measures to advance the common good.
From such a perspective of history and reason this Article will explore
the twin religion clauses of the First Amendment to offer a workable,
contemporary theory on the separation of church and state. In particu-
lar, these comments will build on the historical experience of American
Catholics and the thought of the American Jesuit social philosopher John
Courtney Murray.
Murray was perhaps the most prominent American Catholic theolo-
gian of the twentieth century9 and he was instrumental in reviving an ap-
6. See generally JAMES DAVISON HUNTER, CULTURE WARS: THE STRUGGLE TO
DEFINE AMERICA (1991). For a defense of religious values against what the author calls a
secular-oriented culture, see STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: How
AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS TRIVIALIZE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION (1993). On the
other side, some argue that America would be better off with less religion. See Wendy
Kaminer, The Last Taboo: Why America Needs Atheism, NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 14, 1996, at
24; see also Janny Scott, At Appomattox in the Culture Wars, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 1997,
§ 4 (Week in Review), at 1 (discussing some interesting observations on the current state
of this debate).
7. Thomas Jefferson, Letter to the Danbury Baptist Association, Danbury, Conn.
(Jan. 1, 1802), in THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON (1950), reprinted in JOHN T.
NOONAN, JR., THE BELIEVER AND THE POWERS THAT ARE: CASES, HISTORY, AND
OTHER DATA BEARING ON THE RELATION OF RELIGION AND GOVERNMENT 130-31
(1987).
Jefferson's remarks echoed those of the Puritan dissident, Roger Williams, who wrote in
1644 of the "'hedge or wall of separation between the garden of the church and the wil-
derness of the world."' MICHAEL S. ARIENS & ROBERT A. DESTRO, RELIGIOUS
LIBERTY IN A PLURALISTIC SOCIETY 54 (1996) (quoting ROGER WILLIAMS, MR.
COTrON'S LETTER LATELY PRINTED, EXAMINED AND ANSWERED (1644), reprinted in
PERRY MILLER, ROGER WILLIAMS: HIS CONTRIBUTION TO THE AMERICAN
TRADITION 98 (1953)).
8. See infra notes 249-53 and accompanying text (discussing Pope Gelasius's theory
separating religion and government).
9. See Mary C. Segers, Murray, American Pluralism, and the Abortion Controversy,
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preciation of the common origins of liberalism and the natural law tradi-
tion.' Most importantly, his insights led to a sea-change in world-wide
Catholic thought, a full acknowledgement of the importance of religious
liberty as it had been developed in the American political tradition."
II. THE AMERICAN CATHOLIC EXPERIENCE
The dominant moral thought in our country seems historically to have
been drawn from two classic sources: the Enlightenment model of "rea-
son-as-argument," and the Puritan heritage with its explicitly religious
notions of "truth-as-disclosure.' ' 2 But in post-modern, pluralistic Amer-
ica, other traditions, with their philosophical and cultural legacies, can
now offer fitting comment on issues like church/state relations.13 With
worldwide Catholicism, thanks to Murray, having embraced the distinctly
American theory separating church and state, it may now be time in re-
ciprocal fashion for contemporary Catholic thought to make its own nu-
anced contributions to our country's civic discourse on this important is-
sue.
As America is becoming ever more diverse in its religious practices,
4
the Catholic experience may even present the most appropriate frame-
in JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY AND THE AMERICAN CIVIL CONVERSATION 228 (Robert
P. Hunt & Kenneth L. Grasso eds., 1992) [hereinafter JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY].
10. See Robert F. Cuervo, John Courtney Murray and the Public Philosophy, in JOHN
COURTNEY MURRAY, supra note 9, at 67.
11. See infra notes 281-84 and accompanying text (discussing the Second Vatican
Council's affirmance of religious freedom).
12. David Tracy, Catholic Classics in American Liberal Culture, in CATHOLICISM
AND LIBERALISM 210-11 (R. Bruce Douglass &'David Hollenbach eds., 1994).
13. See id. at 210.
14. There are now 1600 denominations in the United States, half of which have origi-
nated since 1960. See Jon D. Hull, The State of the Union: As Clinton Reports to the Con-
gress, Citizens are Busy Remaking America, TIME, Jan. 30, 1995, at 53, 72 (citing J.
GORDON MELTON, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN RELIGIONS). Of these denomina-
tions, forty-four percent are non-Christian. See id. This is a greater diversity than in any
country in recorded history. See id. As a recent newspaper report described this phe-
nomenon:
The United States, where belief in God remains vastly popular and religious
freedom is guaranteed, is becoming what academic specialists call "a spiritual
marketplace," a great, competitive field where the various Christian denomina-
tions, together with all the world's major faiths and countless minor ones, meet
and jostle for followers and influence.
Gustav Niebuhr, Land of Religious Freedom Has Universe of Spirituality, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 30, 1997, at 1.
The phenomenon of religious pluralism is, of course, worldwide. An international
Catholic leader, Cardinal Francis Arinze, president of the Pontifical Council for Interre-
ligious Relations, recently observed:
[W]e must accept the fact of religious plurality. In our world people are on the
[Vol. 47:1
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work to address this issue. Religious freedom has always been a sym-
bolic element in the American mystique, yet for much of our nation's
history religious minorities were not afforded full acceptance. Even after
the formal abolition of government-sponsored religions in the late eight-
eenth and early nineteenth centuries, a non-sectarian Protestantism 6 was
the defining culture of our country. Catholics were the first sizeable mi-
nority to confront this Protestant establishment and all the discrimina-
tion that it entailed. 7
In the first part of the nineteenth century, for instance, the right of
Catholics to hold public office continued to be restricted in some states,
and violence against Catholic churches and convents occurred with fre-
quency.'8 As late as the mid-nineteenth century, Catholic children in the
public schools were lawfully beaten for refusing to read aloud from the
King James Bible.' 9 Such was the generalized hostility there that Catho-
move. Many Muslim Turks live in Germany and Holland. Many Christian Fili-
pinos live in Saudi Arabia and the emirates. Hindus work in England. Buddhists
have monasteries in Switzerland .... We can accept and respect the rights of oth-
ers, especially the right to religious freedom, both for individuals and for groups.
Cardinal Francis Arinze, Interreligious Relations in a Pluralistic World, ORIGINS, Sept. 21,
1995, at 217, 221-22.
15. See generally CHURCH AND STATE, supra note 1, at 32-89 (discussing the move-
ment for religious freedom in America during the colonial and revolutionary period);
ARIENS & DESTRO, supra note 7, at 45-73; NOONAN, supra note 7, at 93-126.
16. See RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE CASES THAT DEFINE
THE DEBATE OVER CHURCH AND STATE 9 (Terry Eastland ed., 1993) [hereinafter
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY]; see also E. DIGBY BALTZELL, THE PROTESTANT
ESTABLISHMENT: ARISTOCRACY & CASTE IN AMERICA (1964) (presenting the classic
treatment).
For a number of reasons, Protestantism did not find it easy to adjust to the new realities
of America in the twentieth century. See WINTHROP HUDSON, AMERICAN
PROTESTANTISM 130-34 (1961), reprinted in CHURCH AND STATE, supra note 1, at 148-50.
For one thing, the power-centers of this country shifted from country towns to large cities
where the new Catholic and Jewish immigrants gained the ascendancy. See id. Perhaps
even more importantly, the dominance of Protestantism in the nineteenth century de-
pended on periodic bursts of evangelical fervor which were difficult to renew on a mass
scale as America moved into a more sophisticated age. See id.
One of America's finest contemporary novelists makes this point well in his recent work
about an urban Presbyterian minister who loses his faith amid the many changes occurring
in the early part of this century. See JOHN UPDIKE, IN THE BEAUTY OF THE LILIES
(1996).
17. See JAY P. DOLAN, THE AMERICAN CATHOLIC EXPERIENCE: A HISTORY
FROM THE COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT 201-03 (1985).
18. See id. at 201-02; see also CHARLES R. MORRIS, AMERICAN CATHOLIC 60-63
(1997).
19. See Marvin E. Frankel, Religion in Public Life-Reasons for Minimal Access, 60
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 633,634 & n.6 (citing Commonwealth v. Cooke, 7 AM. L. REG. 417,
425-26 (Mass. Police Ct. 1859); Donahoe v. Richards, 38 Me. 376, 399-401 (1854)). On
Protestant control of American public education in the nineteenth century see generally
1997]
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lics set up and paid for their own educational system that went from
grade school to the graduate and professional level. ° And so integral
were such schools to Catholic religious identity2' (or so threatening to the
Protestant majority), that their right to exist had to be settled by a Su-
preme Court decision."
In addition, many nativist groups, from the ante-bellum Know-
Nothings to the Ku Klux Klan and the American Protective Association
of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, fostered overt anti-
Catholicism. 2' Examples of such prejudice were perhaps more subtle but
no less pervasive in other aspects of American society. For example, in
this century, the qualifications of two major party nominees for president
were openly challenged because of their Catholic faith.24 The election of
MORRIS, supra'note 18, at 73.
20. See DOLAN, supra note 17, at 262-93. Education was not the only area where
American Catholics chose to create their own distinctive community. A recent history
contains this description of American Catholicism in the first half of the twentieth century:
It was a Church that insisted on its own uniqueness and rightness and on the ne-
cessity of religion's being utterly pervasive in daily public and private
life .... [T]he Catholic Church attempted nothing less than creating a completely
enveloping state-within-a-state for its own Catholic community. The goal was to
make it possible for an American Catholic to carry out almost every activity of
life-education, health care, marriage and social life, union membership, retire-
ment and old age care-within a distinctly Catholic environment.
MORRIS, supra note 18, at 164.
21. As Justice Robert Jackson saw it in his dissent in Everson v. Board of Education:
Our public school, if not a product of Protestantism, at least is more consistent
with it than with the Catholic culture and scheme of values.... I should be sur-
prised if any Catholic would deny that the parochial school is a vital, if not the
most vital, part of the Roman Catholic Church. If put to the choice, that vener-
able institution, I should expect, would forego its whole service for mature per-
sons before it would give up education of the young, and it would be a wise
choice. Its growth and cohesion, discipline and loyalty, spring from its schools.
Catholic education is the rock on which the whole structure rests, and to render
tax aid to its Church school is indistinguishable to me from rendering the same
aid to the Church itself.
330 U.S. 1, 23-24 (1947) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
22. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (holding that an Ore-
gon statute that required children to attend public primary schools was an unconstitutional
infringement upon the rights of parents to determine how to raise and educate their chil-
dren).
23. See DOLAN, supra note 17, at 202-03.
24. In 1928, Al Smith, a Catholic, was the Democratic nominee for president. The
race generated much anti-Catholic hostility. See id. at 351. Smith lost the election to Her-
bert Hoover. For Smith's reply to questions about his patriotism, see Alfred E. Smith,
Governor Smith replies, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, May 1927, at 721-28, reprinted in CHURCH
AND STATE, supra note 1, at 182-84.
In the fall of 1960, John Courtney Murray remarked that candidate John Kennedy "was
facing an anti-Catholicism as bitter as that encountered by Smith a generation before."
(Vol. 47:1
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John F. Kennedy in 1960 as the country's first non-Protestant president.
was widely heralded as signaling an end to the most virulent anti-
Catholic bias.25
Despite such animosity, Catholics thrived here, in a land where they
were allowed to worship without governmental interference, 2 and politi-
cal leaders were correspondingly prohibited from meddling in their ec-
clesiastical affairs.2 ' During the same time, this beneficial freedom was
often denied to Catholics in other countries even ironically where they
constituted historic majorities. Such actions by anticlerical or totalitar-
ian regimes led American Catholics to appreciate their religious liberty
as one of the chief benefits of limited government. I
And the economic prosperity that American Catholics have generally
enjoyed contributed to this freedom. 9 As Murray pointed out, the faith
of their European ancestors depended on the state for financial support3°
but widespread material abundance, particularly during the post-war pe-
riod, made it possible for American Catholics to sustain their many edu-
cational and charitable institutions through voluntary contributions.3
Yet during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, when Catholics
in America were enjoying religious freedom, statements from their inter-
national leaders often appeared hostile to that basic human right and to
Paul J. Weithman, John Courtney Murray-Do His Ideas Still Matter?, AMERICA, Oct. 29,
1994, at 17; see also infra note 286 and accompanying text (discussing Protestant leaders'
reaction to Kennedy's candidacy for president).
After Kennedy's victory, political observers believed his religion may have helped his
candidacy as much as it hurt it. See DOLAN, supra note 17, at 421. The rise of Catholic
political power may have had as much to do with the concentration of Catholics in large
cities, the "power centers" of mid-twentieth century America, as with the increasingly
larger numbers of Catholics in the population. See HUDSON, supra note 16, at 148.
25. See DOLAN, supra note 17, at 421-22; see also Gerald P. Fogarty, North America,
in MODERN CATHOLICISM: VATICAN II AND AFTER 326 (Adrian Hastings ed., 1991).
26. See generally DOLAN, supra note 17, at 349-83 (discussing how practice of the
Catholic religion flourished in early to mid-twentieth century America).
27. See JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY, WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS: CATHOLIC
REFLECTIONS ON THE AMERICAN PROPOSITION 71 (1960) (recounting the papal nuncio's
consultation with Benjamin Franklin in Paris in 1783). The nuncio told Franklin that the
Vatican would seek the new American government's approval of a bishop for its territory.
He was surprised when Franklin told him Congress had no power over such matters.
28. See generally Peter Steinfels, The Failed Encounter: The Catholic Church and
Liberalism in the Nineteenth Century, in CATHOLICISM AND LIBERALISM, supra note 12,
at 19-44.
29. Cf. DOLAN, supra note 17, at 427.
30. See MURRAY, supra note 27, at 181
31. See id. at 180-81; but see Joseph Claude Harris, Pennies for Heaven: Catholic Un-
derachievers, COMMONWEAL, Apr. 9, 1993, at 8-9 (reporting that American Catholic so-
cial giving is currently lower than that by members of almost all of the Protestant denomi-
nations).
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• 32
closely related ones such as the freedom of conscience. Such papal pro-
nouncements came from a communal tradition that had become rigid
and highly authoritarian." But insights by Murray and other progressives
in the church paved the way for a new understanding of how human
freedom was essential to true community. 4 In response, Catholic doc-
trine underwent a significant shift when Church leaders, gathered world-
wide at the Second Vatican Council in 1965, declared that "the right to
religious freedom has its foundation in the very dignity of the human
person."35
Yet this Catholic turn for personal freedom did not find its roots in the
individualistic premises of liberal prophets like Locke36 and Mill37 but
remained grounded in the communal moral theory of Aristotle3 8 and
32. Pope Gregory XVI made the notorious comment in 1823 that the "right to free-
dom of conscience is an 'insanity."' David Hollenbach, A Communitarian Reconstruction
of Human Rights: Contributions from Catholic Tradition, in CATHOLICISM AND
LIBERALISM, supra note 12, at 127 (quoting Pope Gregory XVI); see also Steinfels, supra
note 28 (noting the Catholic Church's rejection of the values of liberalist thought, such as
freedom of conscience and religion).
A number of American Catholic leaders in the nineteenth century, however, were
strong proponents of a unique identity for the Church in this country, which included a
respect for religious liberty and a commitment to the separation of church and state. See
DOLAN, supra note 17, at 305. Chief among them were Archbishop John England of
Charleston, Archbishop John Ireland of St. Paul, Issac Hecker, founder of the Paulist fa-
thers, and Orestes Brownson, a noted New England intellectual who converted to Catholi-
cism. See id. at 305-08; see also MORRIS, supra note 18, at 63. Archbishop Ireland wrote
at the turn of the century:
The partition of jurisdiction into the spiritual and the temporal is a principle of
Catholicism; no less is it a principle of Americanism. Catholicism and Ameri-
canism are in complete agreement. .... [The Establishment and Free Exercise
Clauses of the First Amendment were] a great forward leap on the part of the
new nation towards personal liberty and the consecration of the rights of con-
science.
JOHN IRELAND, THE STATE AND THE CHURCH 282-83, 285 (John A. Ryan & M.F.X.
Millar eds., 1924), reprinted in CHURCH AND STATE, supra note 1, at 142-43.
33. See KENNETH SCOTT LATOURETrE, A HISTORY OF CHRISTIANITY 1092-95
(1953); see also Joseph A. Komonchak, Vatican II and the Encounter Between Catholicism
and Liberalism, in CATHOLICISM AND LIBERALISM, supra note 12, at 76-78.
34. See infra notes 276-83 and accompanying text.
35. Declaration on Religious Freedom, reprinted in THE DOCUMENTS OF VATICAN II
679 (1966).
36. See generally JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT (C.B. Mac-
pherson ed., Hackett Pub. Co. 1980) (1690).
37. See generally JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (Elizabeth Rapaport ed., Hack-
ett Pub. Co. 1978) (1859).
38. See ARISTOTLE, POLITICS (T.A. Sinclair & T.J. Saunders trans., Penguin Classics
1981), reprinted in A NEW ARISTOTLE READER 507 (J.L. Ackrill ed., 1987).
[Vol. 47:1
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Aquinas. 9 Accordingly, this new Catholic liberalism differed in its ulti-
mate purpose from the classical school of that name' ° and its modern
progeny such as the philosophy of John Rawls. 1 Its raison d'etre was not
so that each individual could be left free to find his or her own ends
alone in some splendid isolation,42 but rather to enable all to develop
their unique selves so that they could share them with others.43
This emphasis on the intersubjective and communicative aspects of
human fulfillment resonates strongly with the contemporary school of• • 44
social thought that goes by such names as communitarianism or civic
republicanism. It is also in line with the insights about the human per-
sonality of such post-modern thinkers as Habermas and Gadamer who
39. See THOMAS AQUINAS, TREATISE ON LAW (SUMMA THEOLOGICA, QUESTIONS
90-97) 5-7 (1963).
40. See Hollenbach, supra note 32, at 137.
41. See generally JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
42. George Kateb may be the best contemporary exponent of this outlook. As he
succinctly stated in a work that traced the origins of individualism from the seventeenth
century English Puritans to modern times: "One's end is found alone." GEORGE KATEB,
THE INNER OCEAN: INDIVIDUALISM AND DEMOCRATIC CULTURE 266 (1992). For a
jurist of high academic credentials who finds Kateb's views appealing, see RICHARD A.
POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 27-28 (1995).
43. See Hollenbach, supra note 32, at 138-39 (quoting the Second Vatican Council's
document Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World (Gaudium et Spes)).
As a renowned contemporary jurist stated:
Personal love and transformative work enable people to escape selfishness
and isolation without denying the weight of subjectivity. In love, they find a con-
nection to another person that simultaneously confirms them in their sense of
self-possession.
UNGER, supra note 2, at 34.
44. See ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY
216-21 (2d ed. 1984). See generally MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS
OF JUSTICE (1982); Harold Berman, Individualistic and Communitarian Theories of Jus-
tice: An Historical Approach, 21 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 549 (1988). The essential human
need for community has been aptly described in this fashion:
Every developed vision of redeemed human society-the visionary imagina-
tion of human association-contains, in one form or another, at least two ele-
ments. Call one of them community and the other objectivity. By community in
this setting I mean human association viewed as a set of relations desired for
their own sake as well as for the independently defined wants that these relations
may satisfy. One of the chief reasons for valuing association for its own sake is
its occasional ability to provide people with a zone of heightened mutual vulner-
ability in which they can free themselves, partly, from the experience of a flat and
insoluble conflict between self-assertion and attachment to other people.
UNGER, supra note 2, at 43-44.
45. See generally Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493 (1988) (pro-
viding a discussion of the social theory of civic republicanism); Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond
the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539 (1988) (same).
1997]
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emphasize, for instance, that we all come to one another as "conversa-
tion partners.,
46
Because of this communal tradition, Catholic thought continues to be
wary of a type of liberal individualism that would not give primacy to the
loving loyalties felt toward those with whom we are connected by kinship
or other human association. And it continues to stress the obligations
47which compassion for the less fortunate press upon us.
Murray also remained true to a strong ethical component in the
Catholic intellectual tradition-the natural law school of morality.4 He
moved it, however, from a static objectivism to a much more supple form
of rationalism-one that was historically conscious, open to searching in-
quiry, and sensitive to the importance of continuing dialogue with those
from other cultures and traditions. Murray saw this natural law ap-
proach as a dynamic, constructive outlook that would allow for what he
called a "future of rational progress"50 in human affairs and yet at the
same time would ultimately have its origins and sanctions in a higher or-
der.
Because of this ethical component, Catholic thought is skeptical of
anti-humanistic practices, even if they are justified by religious beliefs.
The notion of the law's primary role as promoting justice51 and the com-
46. See Tracy, supra note 12, at 207; see also JOSEPH DUNNE, BACK TO THE ROUGH
GROUND: 'PHRONESIS' AND 'TECHNE' IN MODERN PHILOSOPHY AND IN ARISTOTLE
(1993) (exploring the connection between classical Aristotelian theory and the ideas of
Gadamer and Habermas).
47. See NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, ECONOMIC JUSTICE FOR
ALL: A PASTORAL LETIER ON CATHOLIC SOCIAL TEACHING AND THE U.S. ECONOMY
(3d draft 1986). As one recent historian has put it:
The New Deal, pro-union, pro-underdog American Catholic tradition dies hard
and is buttressed by a long line of papal encyclicals and other official statements
stressing human rights, decent wages, equal education, and worker living stan-
dards.
MORRIS, supra note 18, at 305.
48. The natural law tradition holds that law must be grounded in justice, a vision of
good, which humans can comprehend through the use of reason. See MARCUS TULLIUS
CICERO, DE RE PUBLICA DE LEGIBUS 211 (Clinton Walker Keyes trans., 1928);
AQUINAS, supra note 39, at 14-16.
In the modern era, until recently, natural law theory has been principally the province of
Catholic thinkers. Among contemporary authors, however, natural law theory is experi-
encing a revival. See generally JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS
(1980); LLOYD L. WEINREB, NATURAL LAW AND JUSTICE (1987); Daniel J. Morrissey,
Moral Truth and the Law: A New Look at an Old Link, 47 SMU L. REV. 61 (1993) (dis-
cussing other contemporary philosophers whose work is in this tradition).
49. See MURRAY, supra note 27, at 331.
50. Id. at 336.
51. See supra note 48.
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mon good 2 is therefore deeply rooted in Catholic philosophy in a way
that makes legitimate secular and public concerns controlling even over
sincerely held religious practices that thwart those ends.
And yet Catholic thought also reacts against those who would banish
all talk of morality or religiously inspired values from our public dis-
course. 3 The need for an openness to such ideas may be especially acute
today in an era where a rapacious materialism may be filling a spiritual
vacuum in society and eroding long-held ethical standards.54
There is a question, however, whether such a distinct social and moral
outlook strikes a responsive chord with most American Catholics today.
With their successful adaptation and acceptance into the mainstream of
American society, the actions and attitudes of Catholics may now differ
little from those of their Protestant neighbors.55
The effects of widespread prosperity among a large segment of Ameri-
can Catholics are unclear as well. This affluence may have tempered
some of the excessively other-worldly aspects of the faith inherited from
Europe, and it may have correspondingly created a beneficent new
commitment among American Catholics to foster good in the here and
now. 6 On the other hand, it may be that a pervasive interest in material
52. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
53. See Robert J. Araujo, Contemporary Interpretation of the Religion Clauses: The
Church and Caesar Engaged in Conversation, 10 J.L. & RELIGION 493, 493 (1993) (advo-
cating the constitutionality of allowing religious considerations to enter into the public po-
litical and social discourse); Chopko, supra note 3, at 1181-82 (arguing that society would
benefit from the participation of religious institutions in legal and public policy dialogue);
Tracy, supra note 12, at 211 (hoping that the American Catholic social tradition may con-
tribute to the "public realm").
54. See generally JIM WALLIS, THE SOUL OF POLITICS: A PRACTICAL AND
PROPHETIC VISION FOR CHANGE (1994) (presenting an interesting perspective on this
point from a politically progressive evangelical Christian).
55. See Andrew Greeley, Polarized Catholics? Don't Believe Your Mail!, AMERICA,
Feb. 22, 1997, at 11 (discussing polls which show American Catholics becoming progres-
sively more alienated from their leadership during the past two decades, particularly on
issues concerning sexual ethics and the role of women).
56. See DOLAN, supra note 17, at 233-40 (discussing how the devotions and rituals of
the nineteenth and early twentieth century Catholic immigrants brought their world into a
"sacred cosmos"). The same author also describes how the next generation of better-
educated Catholics became involved in the social concerns of the 1960s and 1970s. See id.
at 442-53.
Discussing the views on the afterlife of Reverend Richard McBrien, a leading contem-
porary Catholic theologian, a recent article states: "What some describe as today's apathy
or scanting of heaven, he calls health. It allows Catholics 'to focus on our life in this world
and our responsibility to one another now, and let God take care of the rest."'
David Van Biema, Does Heaven Exist?, TIME, Mar. 24, 1997, at 77-78.
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success has displaced concern for the faith itself and its teachings," in-
cluding perhaps the mandate long felt by most American Catholics to
show concern for the needy.58
Generalizations are difficult here but over centuries of troubles and
missteps the faith has demonstrated substantial staying power and a
unique consciousness undoubtedly remains with the overwhelming ma-
jority of American Catholics.9 "'[O]nce a Catholic, always a Catholic"'
57. See generally Michael Schwartz, The Restorationist Perspective: Catholic Chal-
lenge to Modern Secular America, in AMERICAN AND CATHOLIC: THE NEW DEBATE 71
(Joe Holland & Anne Barsanti eds., 1988). A recent controversy at Notre Dame Univer-
sity has again brought to light this criticism of contemporary American Catholicism. A
priest in the Theology Department, Father Michael Baxter, was denied tenure allegedly
for his views that Catholicism has been robbed of its inherent power by being assimilated
into the dominant American culture. See Pamela Schaeffer, Notre Dame Dispute May
Signal a Shift: Countercultural Catholic Voice Stirs a Storm, NAT'L CATH. REP., Jan. 31,
1997, at 3. Baxter is also critical of John Courtney Murray's position that Catholicism and
the American Constitution are compatible because in his view the ultimate beliefs of
Catholics should set them apart from secular political institutions. See id. As Father Bax-
ter himself has written in language reminiscent of St. Augustine:
However, if "politics" is redescribed in traditional theological terms-as the art
of achieving the common good through participation in the divine life of God-
then substantive religious convictions are central to legitimate political authority,
and interest group "politics" is not truly "politics" at all, but a cacophonous con-
flict of wills.
Michael J. Baxter, "Overall, The First Amendment Has Been Very Good for Christian-
ity"-NOT!: A Response to Dyson's Rebuke, 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 425, 441 (1994).
Father Baxter is allied with the Catholic Worker Movement founded in the 1930s by a
charismatic, left-wing journalist Dorothy Day. See Schaeffer, supra, at 3. As one author
has described their program:
The Catholic Worker put no hope in the modern state; it put faith in the commu-
nity of the sacred;.., the ideal of Christian perfection far surpassed the mini-
malism of the natural-law tradition; ... [ujnlike Catholic liberals, the Catholic
Worker recoiled from politics and argued for a spiritual solution to society's
problems.
DOLAN, supra note 17, at 411.
58. See Harris, supra note 31, at 9 (indicating that the amount of charitable contribu-
tions by Catholics is lower than the average for all American households).
59. The ambivalent state of contemporary American Catholicism is perhaps best
summed up by this excerpt from a statement issued by the National Pastoral Life Center,
Called to Be Catholic: Church in a Time of Peril:
It is widely admitted that the Catholic Church in the United States has entered
a time of peril. Many of its leaders, both clerical and lay, feel under siege and in-
creasingly polarized. Many of its faithful, particularly its young people, feel dis-
enfranchised, confused about their beliefs, and increasingly adrift. Many of its
institutions feel uncertain of their identity and increasingly fearful about their fu-
ture.
Those are hard words to pronounce to a church that, despite many obstacles,
continues to grow in numbers, continues to welcome and assist the poor and the
stranger, and continues to foster extraordinary examples of Christian faith and
witness to the Gospel. The landscape of American Catholicism is dotted with vi-
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is an enduring adage in popular theology that continues to bear out that
insight. 6° Catholics moreover are a critical mass of the country's general
population (twenty-five percent) 6' and more so and of its voting elector-
ate (thirty percent). 2 And if membership on the Supreme Court is any
indication of the influence of a religious group, Catholic leverage is at an
all time high with three of the nine justices professing that faith.63
Reconciling religious freedom with the important secular and public
goals of our commonweal is a crucial part of our continuing constitu-
tional agenda. Such felt needs, as Holmes astutely observed, give life to
the law.64 And by force of both the sizeable numbers of its adherents
and, more importantly, the cogency of its social thought, the Catholic
tradition may now hold the best chance of producing such a workable
theory.
This Article will first summarize the Supreme Court's existing juris-
prudence in this area along with the significant critical comment on those
tal communities of worship and service, with new initiatives, and with older,
deeply rooted endeavors that are kept alive by the hard labor and daily sacrifices
of millions of Catholics. In the face of powerful centrifugal forces, many Catholic
leaders have worked to build consensus and cooperation.
National Pastoral Life Ctr., Called to Be Catholic: Church in a Time of Peril, AMERICA,
Aug. 31 - Sept. 7, 1996, at 5.
60. Andrew M. Greeley, Why do Catholics Stay in the Church?, U.S. CATH., Mar.
1995, at 31 (indicating that Catholics are not leaving the church in any greater proportion
than they have for the last 40 years). The article reported that approximately 85% of
those born Catholic maintain some connection with the church for their entire lives. See
id. Furthermore, the article found that the sacraments of the church and the maternal love
of God embodied in the image of the Virgin Mary provided powerful ties which kept even
skeptical Catholics linked to the Church. See id. at 33-34. As Father Greeley stated:
The sometimes inaccurate dictum "once a Catholic, always a Catholic" is
based on the fact that the religious images of Catholicism are acquired early in
life and are tenacious. You may break with the institution, you may reject the
propositions, but you cannot escape the images.
Id. at 33.
61. See Andrew M. Greeley, The Catholics in the World and in America, in WORLD
RELIGIONS IN AMERICA: AN INTRODUCTION 94 (Jacob Neusner ed., 1994). This per-
centage should continue to grow because approximately "a third of America's eighteen- to
twenty-nine-year-olds call themselves Catholic." MORRIS, supra note 18, at 301.
62. See Timothy J. McNulty, Divided Catholic Voters Up for Grabs: Rich, Poor,
Right, Left-and Very Vital, CHI. TRIB., July 15, 1996, at 1.
63. See Richard Carelli, Court's Religious Makeup May Play Role in 2 Cases,
AUSTIN-AMERICAN STATESMAN, Jan. 25, 1997, at A14. In 1996, Justice Clarence Tho-
mas left the charismatic Episcopal church, announcing that he was again, after a 25-year
absence, an active Roman Catholic. See id. Justices Scalia and Kennedy are also Catho-
lics. See id.
64. See generally Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV.
457 (1897), reprinted in 3 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF JUSTICE HOLMES: COMPLETE
PUBLIC WRITINGS AND SELECTED JUDICIAL OPINIONS OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES
391 (Sheldon M. Novick ed., 1995).
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decisions. It will then bring history and philosophy from the Catholic
tradition to bear on the subject drawing especially from the thought of
Father Murray. Murray, however, did his influential work in the two
decades immediately following the Second World War. It was a time
when American Catholics had come of age.65 And Murray's project was
in large part given over to demonstrating the compatibility between
Catholic principles and the American experience as embodied specifi-
cally in the type of pre-Vietnam liberalism to which he subscribed.6
Over thirty years have passed bringing great changes. Many see
American society as having become progressively less religious during
that time, at least in its dominant themes.67 Certain aspects of Murray's
work, which emphasize the need for American politics to be specifically
conscious of its religious heritage may no longer be fitting, if they ever
were.6 8 And yet his countervailing insights from the Catholic tradition
about the right and appropriateness of the government to exist inde-
pendent from any formal religious connection offer continuing wisdom
to people of many faiths. It may be that we are presently at a moment
where the insights of a creed whose adherents numbered only a tiny frac-• 69
tion of the American population at the time of our nation's beginning
can offer a widely appealing outlook on that critical issue.
III. FOUNDATIONAL JURISPRUDENCE
Although it has been invoked from time to time by the Supreme
Court, the metaphorical language of "a wall separating church and
65. See Segers, supra note 9, at 228. As a recent historian succinctly noted: "except
for the newest waves of Hispanic immigrants, American Catholics have long since made it
in America. As much as any other religious body, they are middle-class, suburban, edu-
cated, affluent." MORRIS, supra note 18, at 431.
66. See generally Richard John Neuhaus, Democracy, Desperately Dry, in JOHN
COURTNEY MURRAY, supra note 9, at 13-18. A recent historian has described Murray's
prominence with these comments:
One of the few Catholic priests ever to teach at Yale up to that time, [Murray]
was a fixture on national commissions like the Rockefeller Commission on Na-
tional Goals and on study groups like those organized by the Fund for the Re-
public, Robert Hutchins's liberal California think tank.
MORRIS, supra note 18, at 273.
67. Cf George Weigel, The Future of the John Courtney Murray Project, in JOHN
COURTNEY MURRAY, supra note 9, at 284.
68. See infra notes 290-95 and accompanying text.
69. See ARIENS & DESTRO, supra note 7, at 71-72 (citing JOHN TRACY ELLIS,
CATHOLICS IN COLONIAL AMERICA 395-96 (1965)). In 1776, the U.S. population con-
sisted of 2.5 million people, 20,000 of which were Roman Catholic. See id. By 1790, there
were about 35,000 Roman Catholics in the United States. See id.
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State, 70 is not found in the Constitution but comes from a letter written
by President Thomas Jefferson in 1802 to a Baptist Association in Con-
necticut.7' The relevant text in the First Amendment itself reads: "Con-
gress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or pro-
hibiting the free exercise thereof. ,72
These two clauses are designed, it is often said, to promote the single
goal of religious freedom.73 Yet commentators74 and the Supreme Court75
itself have often pointed to a tension between the thrusts of the two pro-
visions. Any governmental concession to religious expression can be
seen as support and therefore establishment of religion. Conversely, in
the eyes of a believer, legal restrictions on the practices of a particular
faith or even governmental neutrality between religion and nonreligion
might be seen as a hinderance to free religious expression.7  The Court
has thus stated its goal as walking a "tight rope,"" preserving the auton-
70. See Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 797 (1995)
(Stevens, J., dissenting); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947).
71. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
72. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
73. See Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 217-18 (1963); Edward
McGlynn Gaffney, Jr., The Religion Clause: A Double Guarantee of Religious Liberty,
1993 BYU L. REV. 189, 198; Mary Ann Glendon, Editorial, Religious Freedom and Com-
mon Sense, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 1997, at All. Steven Smith also makes that assumption
when he summaries the jurisprudential debate in this area with this statement: "Judges
and constitutional scholars have been asking, in one form or another, something like the
following question: 'What is the meaning and scope of the principle of religious freedom
embodied in the Constitution?"' SMITH, supra note 5, at 6.
74. See JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1218
(5th ed. 1995) ("There is a natural antagonism between a command not to establish relig-
ion and a command not to inhibit its practice.").
75. See Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668-69 (1970) ("The Court has struggled
to find a neutral course between the two Religion Clauses, both of which are cast in abso-
lute terms, and either of which, if expanded to a logical extreme, would tend to clash with
the other.").
76. See Philip B. Kurland, The Irrelevance of the Constitution: The Religion Clauses of
the First Amendment and the Supreme Court, 24 VILL. L. REV. 3, 24 (1979) (stating that
the "government cannot utilize religion as a standard for action or inaction because [the
First Amendment] clauses, read together as they should be, prohibit classification in terms
of religion either to confer benefit or to impose a burden"); Mark Tushnet, "Of Church
and State and the Supreme Court": Kurland Revisited, 1989 SUP. CT. REV. 373, 377 (ex-
plaining that Philip Kurland believed that exempting individuals from otherwise applica-
ble laws because of their religious beliefs was a violation of the First Amendment).
77. See generally Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U.
CHI. L. REV. 115,125-27 (1992); Gaffney, supra note 73, at 21.4-20.
78. Walz, 397 U.S. at 672.
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79omy and freedom of religious actors while refusing to condone any
sponsorship of religion itself by political entities"0
The only branch of government explicitly banned by the First
Amendment from dealing with religious issues is the federal legislature."
This has led one recent commentator, Professor Steven Smith, to argue
that the framers had no intent to restrict the ability of state governments
to act in those situations.82 The clauses were merely a statement that the
federal government should lack jurisdiction in religious matters-a con-
troversial area that members of the first Congress were happy to leave to
the states as purely local concerns. 3 It is therefore inaccurate, cautions
Smith, to attribute any greater intent to the drafters of the Amendment
other than that the federal government should keep its hands off the is-
84sue.
Smith's position appears to have some historical logic. Through the
early part of the nineteenth century, various states continued to maintain
established religions and to support them from general revenue.85  A
number also had religious tests for public officeholders,86 a practice di-
rectly forbidden in the main part of the federal Constitution. 7
Some practices of our republic's early leaders also appear ambivalent
about the proper nature of the relationship between religion and gov-
ernment. For example, James Madison, who had been a leader for re-
88ligious liberty in his home state of Virginia, was also a principal propo-
nent of the First Amendment as Speaker of the House in the First
Congress." Yet at the same time as the Amendment passed, Congress
approved payment for a congressional chaplain. ° Madison also endorsed
79. See infra notes 128-34 and accompanying text.
80. See infra notes 111-27, 135-83 and accompanying text.
81. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
82. See SMITH, supra note 5, at 47.
83. Seeid at 42.
84. See id. at 45-54.
85. See generally ARIENS & DESTRO, supra note 7, at 45-73 (discussing the historical
practice of public support of religion in the various states before the revolution and in the
early republic). Massachusetts was the last state to abolish the establishment and tax sup-
port of churches in 1833-34. See id. at 51, 73.
86. See generally id. at 100-01, 108.
87. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3.
88. See infra note 107 and accompanying text.
89. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 94 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
90. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 788 (1983).
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Virginia legislation punishing Sabbath-breakers 9' and later, as president,
proclaimed national days of thanksgiving. 2
Through the nineteenth century, only one significant matter reached
the Supreme Court in this area and it involved federal law.93 The Mor-
mons claimed that their religiously inspired practice of polygamy, pro-
scribed by national legislation, was entitled to constitutional protection.9-
The Court quickly dismissed that assertion with a broad statement that
Congress was free to prohibit any religiously inspired practice so long as
it did not formally outlaw a belief.9
In a series of cases in the 1940s, however, the Supreme Court used the
Fourteenth Amendment's due process constraints to extend the First
Amendment's restrictions on religious interference to all political enti-
ties." The first cases involved two practices by Jehovah's Witnesses
which violated state law: soliciting contributions without a license and
refusing to salute the flag at school.99  Although the opinions also had
free speech groundings, the Court ruled that both situations involved ac-
tivity protected by the defendants' rights to freely exercise their relig-
ion.99
The flag salute case, West Virginia State Board of Education v. Bar-
nette,t °° is memorable for Justice Jackson's famous statement generalizing
the American commitment to liberty: "If there is any fixed star in our
constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can pre-
scribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other
91. See SMITH, supra note 5, at 38.
92. See Wallace, 472 U.S. at 103 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
93. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
94. See id. at 161-62.
95. See id. at 166.
96. See generally NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 74, § 10.2, at 339-42 (explaining
general theories of how certain provisions of the Bill of Rights are made applicable to the
states by incorporation through the Fourteenth Amendment).
Professor Kurt Lash has advanced the provocative idea that the framers of the Four-
teenth Amendment adopted an understanding of the Religion Clauses different from the
more limited notions of the First Congress, and it was this broader understanding that was
made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. See Kurt T. Lash, The
Second Adoption of the Free Exercise Clause: Religious Exemptions Under the Fourteenth
Amendment, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 1106, 1156 (1994); see also infra notes 162-65 and 212
(discussing the controversy surrounding the original intent of the first framers); infra notes
350-61 and accompanying text (advancing my own approach to that issue).
97. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
98. See West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), rev'g Min-
ersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
99. See Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 303; Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642.
100. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
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matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith
therein .,,..1
However, these comments made by Justice Frankfurter in dissent may
more accurately state how such freedom must be ordered by law:
Religion is outside the sphere of political government. This
does not mean that all matters on which religious organizations
or beliefs may pronounce are outside the sphere of government.
Were this so, instead of the separation of church and state,
there would be the subordination of the state on any matter
102deemed within the sovereignty of the religious conscience.
The most influential of those early decisions, however, was the 1947
case of Everson v. Board of Education. There Justice Black stated that
the "establishment clause,"'' as he called it, prohibits both the federal
and state governments from not only setting up an official church, but
also from passing any law or supplying any funding which aids any one• • • 105
religion or aids all religions indiscriminately. In other words, the Con-
stitution demands that all entities of government (including public
schools) must be completely impartial on matters of religion. This neu-
trality must not just be between religions, but also between religion and
non-religion.
Justice Black supported his theory by a rather sweeping claim that the
Establishment Clause had its underpinnings in the American colonists'
revulsion against government assistance to any religion. 106 For that
proposition, he cited arguments made in 1785 by James Madison in his
Memorial and Remonstrance against continued tax levies to support the
Episcopal Church in Virginia."7
Justice Black followed Madison's remarks with citations from the Jef-
ferson authored Bill for Religious Liberty which the Virginia Assembly
passed when it rejected the ecclesiastical assessment the following year.108
Black presented the religion clauses of the First Amendment as the natu-
ral outgrowth of those events and imputed Madison's and Jefferson's ar-
guments to its framers.
101. Id. at 642.
102. Id. at 654 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
103. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
104. See id. at 15.
105. See id. at 15-16.
106. See id. at 10-11.
107. See id. at 11-12; see also infra notes 270-71 and accompanying text.
108. See Everson, 330 U.S. at 12.
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The American people, as Black saw it, "reached the conviction that in-
dividual religious liberty could be achieved best under a government
which was stripped of all power to tax, to support, or otherwise to assist
any or all religions. . .. "'09 He summed up by invoking Jefferson again,
citing his metaphor of a wall separating church and state as the ultimate
statement of what was intended by the Constitution's prohibition against
the establishment of religion." °
Using this theory as its foundational jurisprudence, the Court then trod
its way through a variety of religion issues in the post-war era. In the
Everson case itself, Justice Black held for a divided Court that public
funding to bus children to parochial schools did not constitute an uncon-
stitutional establishment of religion.1 ' In the next year, however, the
Court in Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education" ' relied heavily
on his theory to strike down a practice where children were afforded
"release time" to attend religious instruction in the public schools."3
Several years later in Zorach v. Clauson,"4 however, the Court distin-
guished the situation in McCollum from a constitutionally permissible
one where children were released from secular classes for religious in-
struction outside the public school premises."' Writing for the Court,
Justice Douglas, who had voted with the majority to strike down the
McCollum arrangement, now condoned a very similar practice noting
"[wle are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme
Being."
' 6
In the early 1960s, the Court reinforced its "separationist" stance by
striking down prayer... and devotional Bible reading" 8 in the public
schools. It reaffirmed the thrust of those decisions in the mid-1980s
when it refused to sanction a religiously motivated moment of silence at
the beginning of classes." 9 And although the Court permitted a state to
loan textbooks free-of-charge to students in religiously affiliated
109. Id. at 11.
110. See id. at 16.
111. See id. at 18.
112. 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
113. See id. at 210.
114. 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
115. See id. at 308-09.
116. Id. at 313.
117. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 424 (1962).
118. See Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222-24 (1963).
119. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 60-61 (1985).
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schools,2 it struck down a scheme of public financing to directly provide
them in such schools, even if the books dealt only with secular subjects.'2'
The key decision in that area was Lemon v. Kurtzman.122 There the
Court announced a three-part test that any government funding to relig-
ious institutions must pass if it is to be held constitutional.' 23 The state
aid must have a secular purpose, its principal effect must be one that nei-
ther advances nor inhibits religion, and it must not foster "'an excessive
government entanglement with religion.",1
24
As dissident justices have pointed out, that standard seemed to effec-
tively foreclose all public funding because any governmental monitoring
necessary to safeguard against a misuse of such financing could be
deemed "excessive entanglement.' ' 2' Later, in 1985, the Court invoked
just that logic to strike down federal grants to parochial schools for non-
religious, remedial programs,' 26 a practice that one justice conceded had
"'done so much good and little, if any, detectable harm."
27
At about the same time as it was staking out such a strong "separa-
tionist" position on establishment issues, the Court nonetheless issued an
opinion that many see as the high-water mark in its deference to the
practices of religious minorities. In Wisconsin v. Yoder,'28 Amish parents
were prosecuted for violating a state law that required that they send
their children to school until age sixteen.19 The parents' action was mo-
tivated by a sincere theological belief that to allow their children to at-
120. See Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 238 (1968).
121. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 625 (1971).
122. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
123. See id. at 612-13.
124. Id. (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)).
125. See id. at 668 (White, J., concurring and dissenting). Justice White wrote of the
"insoluble paradox" of policing a policy that forbade the teaching of religion in the class-
room, thus, becoming impermissibly "entangled in the 'no entanglement' aspect of the
Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence." Id.
More recently, Justice Scalia compared the Lemon test to a monster that is disliked by a
majority of the justices, but survives because the Court as a whole finds it selectively use-
ful. See Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 398-99
(1993) (Scalia, J., concurring).
126. See Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 414 (1985), overruled by Agostini v. Felton,
117 S. Ct. 1997 (1997). In Agostini, the Court found that fears of "excessive entangle-
ment" in that case were unwarranted. See 117 S. Ct. at 2014; infra notes 176-83 and ac-
companying text.
127. Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 415 (Powell, J., concurring) (quoting Felton v. United States
Dep't. of Educ., 739 F.2d 48, 72 (2d Cir. 1984)).
128. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
129. See id. at 207-08.
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tend school beyond eighth grade would expose them to worldly influ-
ences that contravened the tenets of their religion.30
Before resolving the issue, the Court first stated its admiration for the
Amish's centuries-old faith and their peaceful, productive way of life.'31
It then held for the parents, deeming their religious freedom a "funda-
mental right" that could only be overridden by a "compelling state inter-
est."', 32 In this case, even the state's valid concern for universal public
education did not rise to that'level.'33 Only once earlier, in a matter
dealing with observation of the Sabbath, had the Court required that the
state satisfy such a rigorous test before it could compel legal compliance
from a religious objector.
IV. CRITICISM AND REVISION
As time passed and Court personnel changed, new perspectives
emerged that would challenge both Everson's strict "separationist" ap-
proach to the establishment clause and Yoder's understanding of the free
exercise guarantee as a fundamental right. In a 1981 decision, the Court
held that a state university could not refuse a student religious group ac-
cess to its facilities despite the objection that such use would constitute
governmental promotion of worship.' And in 1983, the Court upheld
legislative prayer by a state paid chaplain."' Side-stepping the Everson'37
and Lemon38 standards, the Court found ample warrant for the practice
in long-established historical actions, including the appointment of
130. See id. at 209.
131. See id. at 222-24.
132. Id. at 214.
133. See id. at 234-36.
134. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963).
135. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 277 (1981). Following that decision, Con-
gress passed the Equal Access Act, which mandates that high schools give religious groups
the same use of its facilities as it affords other non-curricular activities. See 20 U.S.C. §§
4071-74 (1994). In Board of Education v. Mergens, the Supreme Court upheld the Act's
constitutionality in the face of a challenge that it violated the Establishment Clause. See
496 U.S. 226, 253 (1990).
Shortly thereafter, the Court again visited this issue, holding that a public school vio-
lated the Free Speech Clause when it denied the use of its facilities to a group that wanted
to discuss "family values" in a religious context. See Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches
Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 388, 394-95 (1993).
136. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783,792-95 (1983).
137. See supra notes 103-10 and accompanying text.
138. See supra notes 122-24 and accompanying text.
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chaplains by the first Congress in the very week that it also approved the
First Amendment for submission to the states 9
Two years later, however, Justice Rehnquist went further and directly
challenged Everson's holding that the Establishment Clause required
strict governmental neutrality in matters of religion.' 40  Examining at
length various draft proposals of the First Amendment's religion clauses,
he found that they were designed merely to forestall the establishment of
a national religion and any governmental preference among various
sects.'4 ' Therefore, unlike the Virginia documents cited in Everson, the
Congressional proposals were not, according to Justice Rehnquist, in-
tended to require complete governmental neutrality between religion
and nonreligion.142  To further support his "non-preferentialist' ' 43 posi-
tion, Justice Rehnquist also pointed to various actions by early Con-
gresses and presidents that favored religion in a general way, such as en-
couraging it in the territories and declaring national days of prayer.44
In 1983, the same year that it upheld legislative prayer, the Court also
ruled that a state could allow parents a tax deduction for private school
tuition even if that money went to a religiously affiliated institution.'
45
139. See Marsh, 463 U.S. at 788; see also supra note 90 and accompanying text.
140. Justice Rehnquist made these remarks in a dissenting opinion in Wallace v. Jaf-
free, 472 U.S. 38, 91-114 (1985), where the Court struck down a state law providing for a
religiously motivated moment of silence at the beginning of public school classes. See su-
pra note 119 and accompanying text.
141. See Wallace, 472 U.S. at 92-99 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
142. See id. at 98.
143. See RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, supra note 16, at 335 (making the ntn-preferentialist
characterization of the establishment prohibition).
144. See Wallace, 472 U.S. at 100-04 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see also supra note 92
and accompanying text.
145. See Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 400 (1983). In 1973, the Court invalidated
state programs that reimbursed parents whose children attended non-public schools for
part of their tuition. See Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825, 835 (1973); Committee for Pub.
Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 794 (1973). The Court at that time was unconvinced that
such assistance would not advance religion. The majority in Mueller distinguished its case
from the programs in these earlier cases because the tax deductions for education ex-
penses in Mueller were available to parents who sent their children to either public or pri-
vate schools. See 463 U.S. at 398-99. Four dissenters, however, found the distinction
meaningless. See id. at 404-08 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Other recent decisions in this area that may be construed as supporting state aid to re-
ligious schools include Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1993),
permitting government payments to a sign-language interpreter for a deaf student attend-
ing a religiously affiliated school; Witters v. Washington Dep't. of Servs. for Blind, 474 U.S.
481, 489-90 (1986), allowing a state to issue a vocational tuition grant to a blind person to
finance his study for the ministry at a Christian college; and Committee for Pub. Educ. &
Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 648 (1980), permitting reimbursement to relig-
ious and secular nonpublic schools for certain administrative expenses. See also infra
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And the following year a sharply divided Court ruled that a creche dis-
played by a city at Christmas did not violate the Establishment Clause as
long as it was exhibited alongside other seasonal symbols such as Santa
Claus and reindeer.146 The display could then be said primarily to serve
the "secular purpose"'147 of celebrating the winter holidays. Justice
O'Connor concurred, stating that such public acknowledgement of re-
ligion did not violate the Establishment Clause so long as there was no
endorsement of a belief.
4
1
In dissent, Justice Brennan rejected the Court's justification of the Na-
tivity scene as the trivialization of a deeply religious event: "The essence
of the creche's symbolic purpose and effect is to prompt the observer to
experience a sense of simple awe and wonder appropriate to the con-
templation of one of the central elements of Christian dogma-that God
sent His Son into the world to be a Messiah.
1 49
Five years later, governmental celebration of winter religious holidays
again came before the Court in County of Allegheny v. A CLU. There,
an even more fractionalized Court invalidated the display of a Nativity
scene which stood alone at a courthouse."' It upheld, however, the
placement of a menorah in front of another government building where
it was accompanied by a Christmas tree which created an "'overall holi-
day setting."" 2
Justice O'Connor again cited her "non-endorsement" test as the
touchstone of constitutionality,'53 and Justice Kennedy spoke of an even
milder standard which would sustain such governmental action where
there was no coercion involved. 4 No justices made reference to Jeffer-
son's metaphor of the separating wall.
The same issue came before the Court once more in the 1995 case,
Capital Square Review & Advisory Board v. Pinette.15  There, in response
to a menorah placed on a public square, the Ku Klux Klan sought per-
notes 176-83 and accompanying text (discussing the.Court's decision in Agostini v. Felton,
117 S. Ct. 1997 (1997)).
146. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 685 (1984).
147. See id.
148. See id. at 691 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
149. Id. at 711 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
150. 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
151. See id. at 579.
152. Id. at 614 (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 692 (1984) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring)).
153. See id. at 628 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
154. See id. at 662 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
155. 515 U.S. 753 (1995).
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mission to display a privately owned cross in a public park. 56 Citing free
speech grounds, the Court found the action constitutional. Justice
Stevens, however, in dissent resurrected the Everson test stating: "the
sequence of sectarian displays disclosed by the record in this case illus-
trates the importance of rebuilding the 'wall of separation between
church and State' that Jefferson envisioned.'. 5
Justice Rehnquist's rejection of such "separationist" views remained
unconvincing to other justices as well. In the 1992 case, Lee v. Weis-
man,59 the Court by a five to four vote invalidated a nonsectarian prayer
offered by a rabbi at a public middle school graduation. 6° In a concur-
ring opinion, Justice Souter again reviewed the process by which the re-
ligion clauses were drafted and found it significant that in the final ver-
sion no article qualified the noun "religion."' 6 ' The drafts which Justice
Rehnquist had construed as forbidding only discriminatory support for a
single religion, Justice Souter pointed out, were rejected by the fram-
ers. 62 They instead ultimately opted for language banning not "the es-




Justice Souter acknowledged that some activity by the nation's early
leaders indicated they may not have all favored a strict separationist ap-
proach.'6' As he saw it, however, that did not rule out that a "respectable
body of opinion" at the time of the Amendment's ratification wanted
something stricter than a non-preferentialist approach. 1
65
Two years later the Court also struck down a separate school district
that was created so that handicapped children of Hasidic Jews could avail
themselves of government-funded services without leaving their home
166village. The Court found the arrangement to be an allocation of pol-
156. See id. at 758.
157. See id. at 770.
158. Id. at 797; see also note 110 and accompanying text.
159. 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
160. See id. at 599.
161. See id. at 614-15 (Souter, J., concurring).
162. See id. at 620.
163. Id. at 620 (emphasis added).
164. See id at 626.
165. Id. Justice Souter's opinion drew, in large part, from Douglas Laycock, "Non-
preferential" Aid to Religion: A False Claim About Original Intent, 27 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 875 (1985-86). Justice Souter's opinion was joined by Justices O'Connor and Stev-
ens. Included in such early "separationist" viewpoints was the contemporary Catholic sen-
timent on the issue. See infra notes 350-61 and accompanying text.
166. See Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 690
(1994).
[Vol. 47:1
Separation of Church and State
itical power based on religious criteria and, hence, unconstitutional.'
However in Rosenberger v. Rector,'6 decided in 1995, the Court veered
back to a more accomodationist approach. There a state-sponsored uni-
versity levied mandatory assessments on its students and allocated them
to pay the debts of various student organizations.69 One such group,
Wide Awake Productions, was denied funding for the publication of a
magazine that, in the words of its sponsors, would "'facilitate discussion
which fosters an atmosphere of sensitivity to and tolerance of Christian
viewpoints,"' and "'provide a unifying focus for Christians of multicul-
tural backgrounds."17
0
In reality, however the publication's message was often stronger, ac-
tively proselytizing for evangelical Christianity. It routinely made edito-
rial comments like this: "'When you get to the final gate, the Lord will be
handing out boarding passes.... If, in your lifetime, you did not request
a seat on His Friendly Skies Flyer by trusting Him .... [y]ou will be met
by your chosen pilot and flown straight to Hell on an express jet .... " 7'
A majority of the Court nevertheless held that the university's refusal to
pay for the group's printing expenses constituted impermissible view-
point discrimination and thus violated the Free Speech Clause.72
Justice Souter, however, writing for four dissenting justices, found the
practice to be direct public funding of core sectarian activities, thus
striking at the heart of the non-establishment principle.' 7 Even though
such support was distributed among many publications in an even-
handed fashion it violated, Justice Souter said, the cardinal Madisonian
principle forbidding direct government aid to religion.74
Justice Thomas, however, in an opinion concurring with the majority,
took sharp exception with Justice Souter's renewed reliance on Madi-
son's Remonstrance. In passing, he commented, "[o]ur Establishment






168. 515 U.S. 819 (1995). For a provocative reading of this decision and its companion
Pinette, supra notes 155-58, which describes them in farcical tones, see Larry Cati Backer,
The Incarnate Word, That Old Rugged Cross and the State: On the Supreme Court's Octo-
ber 1994 Term Establishment Clause Cases and the Persistence of Comic Absurdity as Ju-
risprudence, 31 TULSA L.J. 447 (1996).
169. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 824 (quoting petitioners' appellate brief).
170. Id. at 825-26.
171. Id. at 865-66 (Souter, J., dissenting).
172. See id. at 845-46.
173. See id. at 898-99 (Souter, J., dissenting).
174. See id. at 868-73.
175. Id. at 861. (Thomas, J., concurring).
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In the most recent ruling on the relationship of government and relig-
ion, Agostini v. Felton,176 the Court, in a five to four decision, overturned
the twelve-year-old Aguilar case. 7 7 It will now allow public school teach-
ers to provide remedial education in parochial schools. The Court based
its about-face on cases decided after Aguilar that it said had changed Es-
tablishment Clause jurisprudence, specifically the Court's "understand-
ing of the criteria used to assess whether aid to religion has an impermis-
sible effect.'
' 78
Based on those precedents, the Court said that it no longer presumed
that the placement of public employees at a parochial school would in-
evitably result in state-sponsored religious indoctrination or constitute a
symbolic link between government and religion.179 And it also said it had
ceased to believe that all government aid to religious schools was invalid,
since it had condoned the use of government grants at religious schools
that were available on a non-sectarian basis.
The Court concluded by adding that it no longer worried that the ex-
cessive entanglement prong of the Lemon test would be breached in this
situation. 8' The Aguilar Court had thought the entanglement prong
would be violated because of the pervasive monitoring that it believed
necessary to ensure public employees would not engage in religious ac-
tivity on private school grounds.'82 The Agostini Court, however, found
such extensive supervision unwarranted since it now believed that the
publicly paid teachers would act as instructed and not engage in religious
indoctrination just because they were in a parochial school setting.' 83
In recent years, the Court's "free exercise" theory has exhibited sub-
stantial change of a similar magnitude as the justices have backed away
176. 117 S. Ct. 1997 (1997) (overruling Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985)); see also
supra notes 126-27 and accompanying text.
177. See Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2016.
178. See id. at 2010; see also Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993);
Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs. for Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986) (both were chief
among the cases that the Court said required this jurisprudential turn); supra note 145.
179. The Agostini Court's principal authority was Zobrest which condoned govern-
ment payments to a sign-language interpreter at a religious school. See Agostini, 117 S. Ct.
at 2010-11.
180. For that proposition, the Agostini Court relied on Witters, the case which allowed
a blind person to use a vocational tuition grant at a religious school, as well as Zobrest. It
also cited other cases such as Mueller v. Allen and even Everson itself as permitting gov-
ernment payments and tax deductions that were available to all students on a non-
sectarian basis. See Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2011-13.
181. See id. at 2015.
182. See supra notes 125-27 and accompanying text.
183. See Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2014.
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from Yoder's sweeping precedent. In a series of cases in the 1980s, the
Court refused to countenance religious exemptions to laws and govern-
ment practices that prohibited racial discrimination""A and mandated mili-
tary attire'85 and a uniform prison diet.8 6 It also declined to give special
protection to Native American burial grounds when their preservation
conflicted with road building and timber harvesting by government agen-
cies.
18 7
In a 1990 case, Employment Division v. Smith,' the Court upheld the
denial of unemployment benefits to individuals who were fired for the
use of peyote at a Native American religious ceremony.' 9 Justice Scalia,
writing for the Court, cited the strong national policy against the use of
hallucinogenic drugs and virtually confined the "compelling state inter-
est" test of Yoder to its facts as a case involving the "hybrid" interests of
parental rights. '90 The government's ability to enforce a neutral law of
general applicability that proscribes socially harmful conduct cannot, Jus-
tice Scalia explained, "depend on measuring the effects of a governmen-
tal action on a religious objector's spiritual development.' ' 9'
In 1993, however, the Court itself clarified Smith to make it plain that a
law could not selectively target the practices of a particular religion. In
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah,'9' the Court found
that ordinances banning religiously motivated animal sacrifice were not
neutral in purpose (since kosher slaughter was exempt), but were passed
to outlaw the practices of a specific church.93 In the Court's opinion, Jus-
tice Kennedy, however, spoke of the Constitution's "religious toler-
ance." 94 Those words troubled some commentators who feared that the
Court might view religious rights as only an indulgence of government,
not as a higher duty owed to God.'95 And Justice Blackmun noted in his
concurring opinion that had the ordinance been motivated by a desire to
184. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 605 (1983).
185. See Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 508-09 (1986). Congress responded to
this opinion by enacting legislation that would, subject to certain exceptions, permit the
wearing of religious apparel by uniformed military personnel. See 10 U.S.C. § 774 (1994).
186. See O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 345-46 (1987).
187. See Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 458
(1988).
188. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
189. See id. at 890
190. See id. at 882, 885.
191. Id. at 885.
192. 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
193. See id. at 540.
194. Id. at 547.
195. See ARIENS & DESTRO, supra note 7, at 257-58.
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prevent cruelty to animals, it might have overridden the religious rights
claimed by the practitioners.'96
The Smith decision was widely criticized as failing to give due defer-
ence to the genuinely religious practices of an historically oppressed mi-
nority.'97 It also caused alarm among many religious organizations who
feared that certain practices might not be granted constitutional protec-
tion.' 98 Responding to such concern, in 1993, Congress, with virtual una-
nimity, passed what it called The Religious Freedom Restoration Act
(RFRA). 9  RFRA purported to overturn Smith' °° and reinstate the more
liberal Yoder standard.'O Under RFRA, any law burdening religious ex-
pression would be inoperative unless it was shown to serve a compelling
state interest and be the least restrictive means of furthering it. 20
Decisions under RFRA, however, did not change Smith's essential
thrust. For instance, in the face of religious challenges, courts upheld
various prison regulations as necessary to protect a "compelling state in-
terest. 20 3 And in one of its most recent decisions, Boerne v. Flores,200 the
Court struck down RFRA itself as an improper exercise of congressional
205power.
In Boerne, religious authorities invoked RFRA to challenge a local
zoning ordinance that prohibited them from expanding a church because
it had been designated an historic landmark . In reviewing the constitu-
tional basis for RFRA, the Court conceded that Congress has power un-
der the Fourteenth Amendment to legislatively enforce the Bill of
196. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 580 (Blackmun, J., concurring
in judgment).
197. Fifty articles were written on the Court's ruling in Smith and most condemned its
decision. See ARIENS & DESTRO, supra note 7, at 253. For the comments of two of the
more prominent scholars that criticize Smith, see Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free
Exercise, 1990 S. CT. REV. 1; Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the
Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109 (1990).
198. See ARIENS & DESTRO, supra note 7, at 254.
199. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (1994).
200. See id. § 2000bb(a)(4).
201. See id. § 2000bb(b)(1).
202. See id. §§ 2000bb(b)(1), 2000bb-1.
203. The courts upheld the prison regulations despite the Senate's rejection of an
amendment that would have specifically exempted prison regulations from RFRA. See
139 CONG. REC. S14,468 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1993); Daniel J. Solove, Faith Profaned: The
Religious Freedom Restoration Act and Religion in the Prisons, 106 YALE L.J. 459 (1996)
(studying many prison cases brought under RFRA).
204. 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997).
205. See id. at 2172.
206. See id. at 2160.
[Vol. 47:1
Separation of Church and State
Rights.O But what Congress does not have, said the Court, is the power•• 208
to substantively change those provisions. And it found RFRA's at-
tempted overruling of Smith to be just such an unconstitutional activity.2°9
In addition to asserting its prerogative over Congress to declare what
the Constitution means, the Boerne Court was also critical of the stan-
dards that Congress set for the states in RFRA:
Requiring a State to demonstrate a compelling interest and
show that it has adopted the least restrictive means of achieving
that interest is the most demanding test known to constitutional
law .... This is a considerable congressional intrusion into the
States' traditional prerogatives and general authority to regu-
late for the health and welfare of their citizens.210
V. IS A JURISPRUDENCE OF RELIGION POSSIBLE?
This diversity of judicial opinion on the appropriate relationship of re-
ligion and government reflects fundamental differences. Should the two
interests be separated as much as possible or be accommodated in some
way? As Justice Souter and others211 have perceptively pointed out, this
was a hot question even among the Amendment's framers, and of course
212
it continues to be so today.
Several distinguished commentators have therefore argued that any at-
tempt to formulate a coherent theory delineating the proper domains of
church and state is doomed to failure. 3 Such boundaries, they say, inevi-
tably end up privileging one of the interests, either the sacred or the
207. See id. at 2163.
208. See id. at 2168.
209. See id. at 2171-72.
210. Id. at 2171.
211. See supra notes 161-65 and accompanying text.
212. For a good summary of various opinions on the relevancy of "original intent,"
that is, what role, if any, historical interpretation should play in the Supreme Court's deci-
sions on religion, see ARIENS & DESTRO, supra note 7, at 96-98.
A noted historian in a well-received recent book has made this apt description of the
perils of ascribing any particular intent to the Constitution's framers:
I think that originalism is vulnerable to two powerful criticisms. First, it is always
in some fundamental sense anti-democratic, in that it seeks to subordinate the
judgment of present generations to the wisdom of their distant (political) ances-
tors. Second, the real problems of reconstructing coherent intentions and under-
standings from the evidence of history raise serious questions about the capacity
of originalist forays to yield the definitive conclusions that the advocates of this
theory claim to find.
JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS xv (1996).
213. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
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secular, at the expense of the other."4 This attitude would be skeptical of
all purportedly principled positions and would see them as ultimately
driven by the religious dispositions of their proponents. It also might ex-
pose the consequentialist logic used to defend those stances with the
following analysis.
Those who find little validity or use for religion, particularly in its or-
ganized varieties, would most likely want to see it marginalized by a
highly "separationist" approach to the Establishment Clause." That ap-
proach would privatize all religiously based values and activity, effec-
tively banishing them from the public forum. Such an outlook would
also seem consistent with a distinctly unfriendly attitude to any legal ex-
216emptions claimed under the Free Exercise Clause. An exception to
that sentiment might exist, however, if those critical of religion were
211sympathetic to the practices of religious minorities or wanted them re-
spected out of a general deference for conscientiously held beliefs."'
On the other hand, those who consider religion a force for good in
human affairs would, it seems, be likely to favor a more accomodationist
approach to the Establishment Clause.219  That approach would leave
214. See generally SMITH, supra note 5, at 99-117.
215. See Kaminer, supra note 6, at 24. As an example of this attitude, Richard
Duncan claims an "eloquent declaration of atheism" by Professor Bruce Ackerman
grounds his opinion that the government ought to make sure that children are assimilated
into "a strictly secular educational culture." Richard F. Duncan, Public Schools and the
Inevitability of Religious Inequality, 1996 BYU L. REV. 569, 582-83.
216. See West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 654 (1943) (Frankfurter,
J., dissenting) (expressing fear of a broad free exercise exemption which would subordi-
nate the state to individual religious consciences); NOONAN, supra note 7, at 238-39 (dis-
cussing religious beliefs of Supreme Court Justices in the 1940s and noting that Frank-
furter was Jewish but belonged to no congregation).
217. See Mark Tushnet, The Rhetoric of Free Exercise Discourse, 1993 BYU L. REV.
117, 134-35.
218. See David E. Steinberg, Rejecting the Case Against the Free Exercise Exemption:
A Critical Assessment, 75 B.U. L. REV. 241 (1995). For a piece that makes an attractive
case for the close relationship between freedom of religious expression and the right to
follow one's conscience, see Rodney K. Smith, Converting the Religious Equality Amend-
ment into a Statute with a Little "Conscience," 1996 BYU L. REV. 645. Smith notes that
the philosophy of the Protestant theologian Paul Tillich equates God with one's central or
ultimate concern. See id. at 660; see also United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 173-76
(1965) (equating a statutory exemption to conscription based on a religious objection to all
war with one based on similar beliefs that were the functional equivalent of a theistic
faith).
219. One of the more candid statements of this preference for religion is: "[T]he point
of the First Amendment is to promote the good of religion, and we should use whatever
rule-neutrality or freedom-best serves that purpose." John H. Garvey, All Things Be-
ing Equal..., 1996 BYU L. REV. 587, 609.
Another forceful exponent of the good of religion in society is STEPHEN L. CARTER,
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much room for religious expression and religiously motivated activity in
public affairs.9 Correspondingly, they would also seem to support a
broad reading of the Free Exercise Clause, allowing generous exemp-
tions to laws which conflicted with creedal practices. 22' Here again, how-
ever, a converse exception to that outlook might exist among those who
favor religion generally, but would be reluctant to extend such freedoms
to the practices of non-mainstream sects with which they feel little affin-
ity.
222
There would thus, according to the skeptics, seem to be no method
that can be truly neutral in this area and give full force to the claims of
both religious and political authority.23 Are they two masters which can-
not equally be served because one, either the sacred or the worldly, must
have the final say thus limiting the other's authority? If so, then the ul-
timate question of which realm is supreme would appear to be controlled
by nothing beyond the beliefs of the legal decision maker.224 Or is it pos-
sible to fashion a theory that gives due deference to the claims of both
the secular and the sacred with each being equally compelling? Of
course there may be conflicts between the two interests as presented in
the demands of various regimes, but Catholic thought has long main-
tained that the claims of religion and politics are not hostile, but compli-
THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: How AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS TRIVIALIZE
RELIGIOUS DEVOTION (1993). Professor Carter writes: "There is nothing wrong with the
metaphor of a wall of separation [between church and state]. The trouble is that in order
to make the Founders' vision compatible with the structure and needs of modern society,
the wall has to have a few doors in it." Id. at 109.
220. This is the view that some commentators attribute to the framers of both the First
and the Fourteenth Amendments. See generally Bradley, supra note 3, at 827; Destro, su-
pra note 3; Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Ex-
ercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409 (1990). Chief Justice Rehnquist shares that
opinion. See supra notes 140-44 and accompanying text.
221. See Chopko, supra note 3; Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Jr., Hostility to Religion,
American Style, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 263 (1992); see also Angela C. Carmella, State Con-
stitutional Protection of Religious Exercise: An Emerging Post-Smith Jurisprudence, 1993
BYU L. REV. 275 (advocating a similar viewpoint from the standpoint of state constitu-
tional law); Daniel Gordon, Reestablishment of Religious Freedom: Developing an Alter-
native Model Based on State Constitutionalism Privacy, 66 MIss. L.J. 127 (1996) (same).
222. Compare the friendly reception given to the practices of the Amish whose peace-
ful, productive way of life the Supreme Court admired, see supra text accompanying notes
128-32, to the Court's rejection of the Native Americans' long-standing use of peyote, see
supra text accompanying notes 188-91.
223. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
224. Of course, Legal Realists and The Critical Legal Studies Movement have been
saying this for some time about all judicial rulings. For my discussion of their views and a
defense of rational legal decision-making, see Morrissey, supra note 48; see also SMITH,
supra note 5, at 119-27 (arguing that political compromise is the only way to resolve these
issues, making pragmatism, not principle, the determining factor). Mark Tushnet similarly
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mentary. 25 As Murray wrote: "[T]he creation of a temporal order of jus-
tice and civic fraternity has been a humanistic aspiration connatural to
the Christian heart.
22 6
If such is the case, the task is then to fashion such an appropriate the-
ory of church-state relations and to present it for discussion to our plu-
ralistic, possibly fragmented, society. As Murray pointed out, this is a
problem of ontology and epistemology evoking profound issues con-
cerning the structure of reality and our ability to know it and discuss it
with others.22' And as a good, natural lawyer, Murray always held that
those questions were accessible to human reason. He thus wrote: "This
underlying social structure is a matter of theory, that is, it is to be con-
ceived in terms of a theorem with regard to the relation between the sa-
credness inherent in man and the manifold secularities amid which hu-
man life is lived.,
228
So any theory on the separation of church and state would have to find
its warrant in the persuasiveness of its arguments, that is, whether others
of open mind find them convincing and presenting a truly workable
framework for human aspirations. It could also find support in history
and tradition, including perhaps even in the complex motives of those
who drafted and approved the original text of the religion clauses.229
Although such general principles, as Holmes astutely observed, "do
not decide concrete cases," 230 they may at least present a background for
continued civic discourse on this crucial topic. The American-Catholic
tradition offers a dialogue with an intellectual legacy that stretches from
the scriptures and classical antiquity through the medieval, modern, and
advocates a regime of mutual forbearance where religious actors would not press to have
their practices adopted into policy, and their opponents would correspondingly tolerate
such activity if conducted only in private. See Tushnet, supra note 3, at 736-38. But with
such a resolution the "separationist" interests would seem to be privileged without any
principled justification.
225. For instance, consider these remarks by Pope Pius XII in 1951:
The profession of Christian truth and fidelity to the fundamental tenets of the
Catholic faith are indissolubly bound up with the sincere and constant assertion
of human nature's most authentic and exalted values .... True religion and pro-
found humaneness are not rivals. They are sisters. They have nothing to fear
from one another, but everything to gain.
MURRAY, supra note 27, at 176.
226. Id. at 192.
227. See id. at 198-99.
228, Id. at 199.
229, See infra notes 298-304 and 350-61 and accompanying text.
230. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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post-modern world. It is in closing that "hermeneutic circle,"23' I believe,
that such a perspective can best be found.
VI. A THREE THOUSAND YEAR HERITAGE
The union of government and religion was the norm in antiquity, often
with the king or emperor being held up as a divine or priestly figure with
his rule embodying transcendent truth.232 Two traditions laid claim to by
Catholicism, however, offered a different arrangement. The Hebrew
Scriptures present a God who is quite direct in His demand that people
233not give allegiance to the established order.
Contemporary scripture scholarship has come to see what we know as
the Hebrew conquest of Palestine as something akin to a peasant re-
volt.23 It seems the indigenous underclass joined with refugee slaves
from Egypt to overthrow the Canaanite kings and the sacred hegemony
of their gods.2" And when those rebels were successful, their political
units continued to have an anti-establishment thrust. At first, under
God's guidance, the Israelites resisted kingship altogether,236 but ulti-• 231
mately at His direction they chose for their ruler David, an outlaw, who
would become their most renowned leader. Religion was in control here,
but it was anti-formalistic in spirit, stressing ethical behavior and works
of justice and mercy.238
231. See infra note 350 and accompanying text.
232. Cf. MURRAY, supra note 27, at 202. As Murray put it: "Augustus was both
Summus Imperator and Pontifex Maximus; the ius divinum was simply part of the ius ci-
vile." Id.
233. Various Biblical commands, like the following order to the Israelites preparing to
enter the land of Canaan, represent this uncompromising Divine mandate: "Take care not
to make a covenant with the inhabitants of the land to which you are going, or it will be-
come a snare among you. You shall tear down their altars, break their pillars, and cut
down their sacred poles." Exodus 34:12-13 (Catholic ed., Catholic Bible Press 1993). For
a fine treatment of this issue by a Catholic scholar who brings together the best recent
studies of the Hebrew Scriptures, see J.P.M. WALSH, THE MIGHTY FROM THEIR
THRONES (1987).
234. See WALSH, supra note 233, at 36-51; see also KAREN ARMSTRONG, A HISTORY
OF GOD: THE 4000-YEAR QUEST OF JUDAISM, CHRISTIANITY AND ISLAM 19 (1993).
235. See WALSH, supra note 233, at 36-37.
236. See 1 Samuel 8:1-22; WALSH, supra note 233, at 67-93.
237. See 1 Samuel 27:1-12.
238. This tradition continued through the prophets and may be best summarized by
this famous injunction: "With what shall I come before the LORD, and bow myself before
God on high? ... He has told you, 0 mortal, what is good; and what does the LORD re-
quire of you but to do justice, and to love kindness, and to walk humbly with your God?"
Micah 6:6-8 (Catholic ed., Catholic Bible Press 1993).
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In classical Greece, on the other hand, a rationalistic perspective de-
veloped that seemed to sidestep religion altogether, giving primacy to
philosophy.239 Starting the century before Socrates, certain thinkers be-
gan to look to nature for ethical principles. 240 And one of them, Heracli-
tus, held that humans are capable of apprehending such knowledge.
Socrates himself built on that critical tradition, finding standards of
political and moral order not in the prevalent polytheism of his day, but
242in a quasi-divine inner voice. Perhaps most typical of this attitude was
his famous assertion in dialogue with Euthypro that something is not
good because it pleases the gods, but it pleases the gods because it is
good. 243
Plato244 and Aristotle 245 made their contributions to classical republi-
canism, but it was the Stoic philosophers, both in the Hellenistic world
and then in Rome, who carried this rationalist tradition forward.246
Through their influence on the jurists, this rationalism became imbedded
in Roman law, first as the ius gentium, a kind of ubiquitous commercial
law, and then ultimately as the ius naturale, the natural law.2 47 As ex-
plained by Cicero, this was a set of moral and juridical standards, univer-
sal in scope, which were rooted in an ultimate rational principle, the Lo-
248
gos.
With the rise of Christianity and the subsequent decline and fall of the
Roman Empire in the West, an early medieval pope, Gelasius, was the
first to espouse a theory separating religious and political authority into
239. See generally, IGNATIUS BRADY, A HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY 28
(1959).
240. See ROBERT C. SOLOMON & KATHLEEN M. HIGGINS, A SHORT HISTORY OF
PHILOSOPHY 25-36 (1996).
241. Even though Heraclitus was famous for his beliefs about the flux of the material
universe ("one cannot step in the same river twice"), he also believed in the existence of a
unifying principle to the cosmos which he called the logos. Id. at 33. Through reason, this
principle was accessible to at least some humans. See id; see also David T. Mason, Ani-
madversions on John Courtney Murray's Political Ontology, in JOHN COURTNEY
MURRAY, supra note 9, at 150.
242. Socrates called this inner-voice his "'daemon."' SOLOMON & HIGGINS, supra
note 240, at 47. It was paradoxically reminding him at all times of both his basic ignorance
and that knowledge alone would save him. See id.
243. See Euthyphro, in I THE DIALOGUES OF PLATO 383-98 (B. Jowett trans., 1937)
(c. 428-384 B.C.E.).
244. See generally The Republic, in 1 THE DIALOGUES OF PLATO, supra note 243, at
591-879.
245. See generally ARISTOTLE, supra note 38, at 507.
246. See Mason, supra note 241, at 150-51; see also WEINREB, supra note 48, at 35-42.
247. See WEINREB, supra note 48, at 44-46; Mason, supra note 241, at 151.
248. See generally CICERO, supra note 48.
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two distinct spheres. In 494 C.E., he wrote the eastern Emperor Anasta-
sius: "'Two [swords] there are, august emperor, by which this world is
chiefly ruled, the sacred authority of the priesthood and the royal
power.'
2 41
Yet in this "dyarchy," as Murray called it,25 later Church leaders ar-
gued that Gelasius had given religious authorities the upper hand.5
Following the teachings of St. Augustine, who stressed the inherent sin-
fulness of human institutions, later popes claimed that Gelasius must
have afforded ecclesiastical officers the ultimate authority to determine
the jurisdiction of each force. That was necessary, they said, to check the
power of the state lest it infringe on the spiritual prerogatives of the
Church.2 3
249. See HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE
WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION 92 (1983).
250. MURRAY, supra note 27, at 205. Murray prefers the term dyarchy to "dualism."
See id.
251. The crucial passage from Gelasius to the Emperor is "'although you take prece-
dence over all mankind in dignity you piously bow the neck to those who who [sic] have
charge of divine affairs."' William R. Luckey, The Contribution of John Courtney Murray,
S.J.: A Catholic Perspective, in JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY, supra note 9, at 28-29.
252. See generally SAINT AUGUSTINE, THE CITY OF GOD (Marcus Dods trans., 1950)
(c. 354-430 C.E.). The best twentieth century American Augustinian voice was the famed
Protestant social theorist, Reinhold Niebuhr, a contemporary of Murray. An apt summa-
tion of Niebuhr's views on the church-state issue is as follows:
I have argued that with respect to religious participation in politics, the Nie-
buhrian stance welcomes religion as a full participant, but calls on religious ac-
tivists to express humility by presenting their arguments in terms others can un-
derstand. With respect to other church-state questions, the Niebuhrian stance is
deeply concerned with the problem of secularization driven by an active secular
government. Nevertheless, Niebuhrian insights suggest that government-
sponsored religion is an inappropriate means to address the problem. Instead,
government should, through various means, accommodate the independent re-
ligious activity of individuals and groups.
Thomas C. Berg, Church-State Relations and the Social Ethics of Reinhold Niebuhr, 73
N.C. L. REV. 1567, 1637-38 (1995). Professor Berg ends his article with this quote from
Niebuhr, indicative of his deep, Augustinian pessimism about the human condition:
"'Nothing that is worth doing can be achieved in our lifetime; therefore we must be saved
by hope."' Id. at 1639 (quoting REINHOLD NIEBUHR, THE IRONY OF AMERICAN
HISTORY 63 (1952)).
As a natural lawyer and disciple of Aquinas, Murray did not share such a negative atti-
tude about human possibilities. See supra notes 225-26 and accompanying text. However,
he and Niebuhr were often associated together and they both were the subject of cover
stories in Time magazine. See Richard John Neuhaus, Democracy, Desperately Dry, in
JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY, supra note 9, at 5.
253. The classic medieval statement is Pope Boniface VIII's bull Unam Sanctam in
1302 which states:
[Cjertainly anyone who denies that the temporal sword is in the power of Peter
has not paid heed to the words of the Lord when he said, "Put up thy sword into
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Gelasius's dictum thus set the stage for frequent clashes between papal
and civil powers during the Christian Middle Ages.254 But in the thir-
teenth century, the scholastic philosopher Thomas Aquinas made two
pivotal moves that would free political authority from ecclesiastical con-
trol and lay the groundwork for religious liberty. As Murray pointed out,
Aquinas seized on Europe's rediscovery of Aristotelian thought to pres-
ent political authority and law as grounded solely in the natural order of
human activities."' Aquinas's deep faith saw these earthly matters as ul-
timately under God's providential ordering of all existence which he
called the Eternal Law.256 Yet his Aristotelian ontology gave temporal
power a mandate that was independent of the Church's authority.
Through human reason alone, a ruler could draw on baseline moral prin-
ciples to establish law for the common good.57
Aquinas also led another significant turn away from ecclesiastical ab-
solutism. Although he condoned the burning of heretics and apostates as
28just punishment for those who had broken faith with the community,
he defended the imperatives of conscience, arguing that one is bound to
259follow a sincerely held belief, even if it is erroneous. It may be a bit
much to see Aquinas as a progenitor of modern liberalism yet he was
an important link in the transmission of Socratic-Aristotelian humanism
to ensuing generations.
With the Reformation, the spiritual independence that Gelasius and
his medieval successors had defended as the freedom of the Church be-
came transformed into principles of religious and conscientious liberty
its sheath"(Matthew 26:52). Both then are in the power of the church, the one by
the hand of the priest, the other by the hand of kings and soldiers, though at the
will and sufferance of the priest.
Luckey, supra note 251, at 29-30 (quoting Boniface VIII, Unam Sanctum, in THE CRISIS
OF CHURCH AND STATE, 1050-1300, at 189).
254. Cf BERMAN, supra note 249, at 92. Many medieval kings and emperors, how-
ever, refused to accept a subordinate role but rather claimed their superiority to ecclesias-
tical authority by actions such as investing bishops with their official robes. See id.
255. See Luckey, supra note 251, at 31-32.
256. See AQUINAS, supra note 39, at 12-13.
257. See id. at 17-19.
258. See NOONAN, supra note 7, at 36-41.
259. See id. at 41-45; supra note 242 and accompanying text (explaining what I believe
is the Socratic root of Aquinas's assertion about the demands of conscience).
260. Aquinas, however, has been hailed as "the 'father of the Enlightenment,' the di-
rect ancestor of rational philosophy, of Descartes and of Kant." FRIEDRICH HEER, THE
MEDIEVAL WORLD: EUROPE 1100-1350, at 219 (Janet Sondheimer trans., 1962); see also
THOMAS CAHILL, HOW THE IRISH SAVED CIVILIZATION (1995) (writing provocatively
on the role that early medieval Irish monks played in the transmission of the rational hu-
manistic tradition from classical antiquity to enlightened high medievalists like Aquinas).
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for the individual. Then with the antipathy to organized religion ush-
ered in by the Enlightenment, European Catholicism was put further on
the defensive.16' This culminated in what Murray called Jacobin secular
absolutism-Robespierre enthroning the goddess of Reason in Notre
Dame Cathedral.263
The French Revolution's anticlericalism was perhaps the dominating
spirit of continental politics through the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries.2 6 European Catholicism countered not only with blanket con-
demnations of liberal propositions such as Pius IX's notorious Syllabus of
Errors26 but also with renewed assertions of its own absolutism such as
the First Vatican Council's Declaration of Papal Infallibility.
26
But as Murray saw it, American Catholicism was spared this European
baggage of outright governmental hostility through a happy coincidence
261of circumstances. Our revolution was considerably less ideologically
radical than the French, and established churches in America were
hardly seen as privileged handmaidens of a despised ancient regime.268
Our land, even from its early European settlement, had a healthy diver-
sity of denominations.269 And when states such as Virginia moved to dis-
261. See MURRAY, supra note 27, at 201-06.
262. The famed French philosopher Voltaire (d. 1778), among others, "held up to ridi-
cule the superstition and bigotry of organized religion." WILLIAM H. MCNEILL, THE
RISE OF THE WEST: A HISTORY OF THE HUMAN COMMUNITY 687 (1963).
263. See MURRAY, supra note 27, at 208-15.
264. See LATOURETE, supra note 33, at 1093; see also MURRAY, supra note 27, at 68
(discussing the French government's legal regulation of the Church under the theory of
the "principle of the primacy of the political").
265. See MURRAY, supra note 27, at 68; see also Joseph A. Komonchak, Vatican II and
the Encounter Between Catholicism and Liberalism, in CATHOLICISM AND LIBERALISM,
supra note 12, at 77-78.
One of the most notorious of those assertions was Pius IX's rejection of the proposition
that "the Roman Pontiff can and should reconcile and accommodate himself to progress,
liberalism, and recent civilization." Id. at 78 (citing Pius IX, Syllabus of Errors, prop. 80,
reprinted in ENCHIRIDION SYMBOLORUM (Henricus Denzinger & Adolphus Sch6metzer
eds., 32d ed. 1963)).
266. See LATOURETrE, supra note 33, at 1093-95.
267. See MURRAY, supra note 27, at 56-60.
268. Cf id. at 56-57.
269. See id. at 58-59. The classic commentary on this religious diversity and its connec-
tion with the democratic tendencies of our early republic is ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE,
DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (Richard D. Heffner ed., Penguin Books 1956) (1840). There,
de Tocqueville, the aristocratic French visitor to America in the 1830s, wrote:
I have seen no country in which Christianity is clothed with fewer forms, figures,
and observances than in the United States; or where it presents more distinct,
simple, and general notions to the mind. Although the Christians of America are
divided into a multitude of sects, they all look upon their religion in the same
light. This applies to Roman Catholicism as well as to the other forms of belief.
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establish a particular church, they did so to further, in Madison's words,
"the generous policy" of "offering an Asylum to the persecuted and op-
pressed of every Nation and Religion."27 In the incipient democratic
spirit of the new nation, Madison rejected establishment because it "de-
grades from the equal rank of Citizens all those whose opinions in Re-
ligion do not bend to those of the Legislative authority.,
27'
Most importantly, even Americans in our republic's early years who
professed no faith themselves tended for the most part to view religion
272with indifference, not animosity. As de Tocqueville astutely pointed
out, the new Americans were usually too busy with economic pursuits to
fight the Old World's ideological battles over religion.273
Murray noted that with such a provenance our Constitution's religion
clauses did not share the Jacobin tradition of imperious secularism, but
were merely what he called "articles of peace" for a pluralistic society.1
74
Id. at 154.
270. James Madison, To the Honorable the [sic] General Assembly of the Common-
wealth of Virginia A Memorial and Remonstrance, reprinted in NOONAN, supra note 7, at
109-10; see supra note 107 and accompanying text.
271. Madison, supra note 270, at 110. In the legislature of the new state of Maryland, a
colony founded by Catholics, a similar bill failed in 1785 which also would have supported
all religious denominations through tax revenue. See DOLAN, supra note 17, at 109. Most
of the Catholic delegates opposed it, fearing that it would be the beginning of the estab-
lishment of the Protestant Episcopal Church. See id.; infra notes 359-60 and accompany-
ing text.
272. See MURRAY, supra note 27, at 58.
273. See DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 269, at 154-55 (describing the clergy's lack of
interference in the American people's pursuit of prosperity). As Murray put it: "The mer-
chants of New Jersey, New York, Virginia, and the more southern colonies were as em-
phatically on the side of religious freedom as on the side of commercial profits. Persecu-
tion and discrimination were as bad for business affairs as they were for the affairs of the
soul." MURRAY, supra note 27, at 59.
De Tocqueville also noted the general acceptance of Christianity but was quick to point
out that religious influence had its limits. Reflecting on the separation of church and state
in the new republic he wrote, "[r]eligious institutions have remained wholly distinct from
political institutions, so that former laws have remained easily changed while former belief
has remained unshaken." DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 269, at 6. He also made this
comment about the favorable climate that existed in the new American republic for the
Catholic faith:
America is the most democratic country in the world, and it is at the same
time (according to reports worthy of belief) the country in which the Roman
Catholic religion makes most progress. .... Many of the doctrines and practices of
the Romish Church astonish them [American Protestants]; but they feel a secret
admiration for its discipline, and its great unity attracts them.
Id. at 29.
274. See MURRAY, supra note 27, at 56-59. As Murray also noted, "[i]f history makes
one thing clear it is that these clauses were the twin children of social necessity, the neces-
sity of creating a social environment, protected by law, in which men of differing religious
faiths might live together in peace." Id. at 57.
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And correspondingly, our laws would carry only the modest, but mean-
ingful legitimacy of being grounded in the shared values of the commu-
nity, not the dogmatic stamp of either ecclesiastical or secular absolut-
ism.
275
Thanks in part to thinkers like Murray, but most importantly to a re-
markable man who became Pope John XXIII, the world-wide Catholic
Church itself finally became willing to drop its claims to special status in•• 276
legal and political matters. From the time of Constantine, of course,S 277
the Church had asserted such prerogatives. But Pope John opened the
Second Vatican Council in 1962 with remarks that were highly critical of
those who argued that the old arrangements were best.278 He called the
traditionalists "'prophets of doom"' who denounced the modern world
and spoke as if the Church's privileged connections of the past had been
275. See id. at 68-69, 74-75.
276. See generally Komonchak, supra note 265, at 76 (examining the effect of Vatican
II on church-state relations). This privileged relationship was often referred to as the "al-
tar-and-throne arrangements of the confessional state." Weigel, supra note 67, at 277; see
also Peter Hebblethwaite, John XXIII, in MODERN CATHOLICISM: VATICAN II AND
AFTER 27 (Adrian Hastings ed., 1991) (addressing the effects of Pope John XXIII's con-
tribution to Vatican II).
277. See supra note 253 and accompanying text. Constantine converted to Christianity
after his famous vision on October 28, 312 C.E. predicting victory over his rival Maxentius.
See JOHN DOMINIC CROSSAN, JESUS: A REVOLUTIONARY BIOGRAPHY 201 (1994). He
later summoned a council of the Christian bishops at Nicea to settle various theological
disagreements that might imperil imperial unity. See id. The historian Eusebius offers this
interesting description of the banquet that celebrated the conclusion of that meeting:
Detachments of the bodyguard and troops surrounded the entrance of the palace
with drawn swords, and through the midst of them the men of God proceeded
without fear into the innermost of the Imperial apartments, in which some were
the Emperor's companions at table, while others reclined on couches arranged
on either side.
Id.
Professor Crossan, a noted Catholic scripture scholar, writes forcefully that this close
relationship with imperial power was a betrayal of the essential message of Jesus, which he
describes as follows: "His [Jesus'] strategy, implicitly for himself and explicitly for his fol-
lowers, was the combination of free healing and common eating, a religious and economic
egalitarianism that negated alike and at once the hierarchical and patronal normalcies of
Jewish religion and Roman power." Id. at 198 (emphasis omitted).
Another leading Catholic scripture scholar made a similar point in his recently pub-
lished description of Jesus' life:
He [Jesus] encountered people of every kind, in word and deed, in a bold, pro-
phetic, at times even spectacular ministry of confrontation as well as compassion;
in doing so, he was willing to set aside accepted forms of socio-religious discrimi-
nation. He assured known sinners of God's forgiveness and mercy, and did not
avoid table fellowship with them as well as many others.
Frans Jozef van Beeck, Who Do You Say I Am? Coming to Know Jesus, COMMONWEAL,
June 20, 1997, at 13.
278. See Komonchak, supra note 265, at 78.
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to its advantage. 7 ' They ignored, he said, the degree to which such status
had been "purchased at the loss of the church's freedom" to pursue its
true mission.""
Following Pope John's lead, the Council went on to affirm two key
principles that strongly resonated with the American experience. In its
Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World, the Council
gave full force to the autonomy of political authority. 1 And in a follow-
up document, the Declaration on Religious Liberty, of which Murray was
a principal draftsman,"" the Council made this ringing endorsement of
religious freedom:
[A person] ... is not to be forced to act in a manner contrary to
his conscience. Nor, on the other hand, is he to be restrained
from acting in accordance with his conscience, especially in mat-
ters religious. The reason is that the exercise of religion, of its
very nature, consists before all else in those internal, voluntary
and free acts whereby man sets the course of his life directly
toward God."3
The Church, to paraphrase Pope John's aspirations, had made its long
overdue rendezvous with the modern world.284
279. Id.
280. Id.; see also MORRIS, supra note 18, at 327-30.
28t. See PASTORAL CONST. ON THE CHURCH IN THE MODERN WORLD, reprinted in
THE SIXTEEN DOCUMENTS OF VATICAN I AND THE INSTRUCTION ON THE LITURGY
596 [hereinafter SIXTEEN DOCUMENTS]. The document made that point directly with this
statement: "The Church and the political community in their own fields are autonomous
and independent from each other." Id.; see also Komonchak, supra note 265, at 80-83
(analyzing the statements of the Council, which draw a distinction between the Church
and politics).
282. See DOLAN, supra note 17, at 425. Murray's status as an expert at the Council is
indicative of the rapid change that was occurring in Catholic thought. As late as 1963, he
had not been allowed to speak at The Catholic University of America in Washington, D.C.
See id. at 443.
283. VATICAN COUNCIL II, DECLARATION ON RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, reprinted in
SIXTEEN DOCUMENTS, supra note 281, at 400. The document also made these comments
that are relevant to issues involving restraints on religious practice: "The right to religious
freedom is exercised in human society: hence its exercise is subject to certain regulatory
norms. In the use of all freedoms the moral principle of personal and social responsibility
is to be observed." Id. at 403.
284. See DOLAN, supra note 17, at 424. Pope John used the Italian word "aggiorna-
mento" to describe the purpose of the Council. See id. Its purpose was "to bring the
Church up to date." Id. Several years earlier, Pope John had written, "we are not on
earth as museum-keepers, but to cultivate a flourishing garden of life and to prepare a glo-
rious future." Hebblethwaite, supra note 276, at 28.
One Catholic social scientist recently summarized the ongoing effects of the Council,
stating that:
We must remember that with Vatican II we made a quantum leap from the 16th
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VII. PUTTING MURRAY IN PERSPECTIVE
Murray's principal work was done in the 1950s, a time when American
Catholics still had to contend with the implication that they were some-
what less than fully patriotic Americans.2 ' For example, as late as 1960,
a group of ministers headed by Norman Vincent Peale, one the nation's
most respected Protestant leaders, issued a statement urging that "no
Catholic be trusted with the Presidency., 28 6 Understandably then, the
thrust of Murray's work was polemic in nature." His major thesis was
that Catholic social thought was fully compatible with the American ex-
288perience . Interestingly, presidential candidate John Kennedy was not
quite so sure that such would always be the case. Addressing a conven-
tion of Baptist ministers in Houston during the 1960 campaign, Kennedy
promised to resign the presidency should a conflict arise between his
faith and his duties under the Constitution.289
But much of Murray's writings were given over to demonstrating that
one could be both a true Catholic and a loyal American. Not only did he
present the separation of church and state as an idea that had originated
to the 19th century. The council legitimized religious liberty, collegiality, ecu-
menism, liturgical reform, a concern for social justice and a greater role for the
laity. This was an extraordinary achievement that cannot be rolled back. These
reforms are deeply rooted at the parish level and are now part of our Catholic
identity.
Thomas J. Reese, 2001 and Beyond: Preparing the Church for the Next Millennium,
AMERICA, June 21-28, 1997, at 17.
285. See generally PAUL BLANSHARD, AMERICAN FREEDOM AND CATHOLIC POWER
(1949) (warning that the Catholic hierarchy might take control of education and family
relationships if Catholics ever constituted a democratic majority in America); JAMES M.
O'NEILL, CATHOLICISM AND AMERICAN FREEDOM (1952) (presenting a Catholic
author's vigorous counterattack).
In addition, several highly publicized controversies in the late 1940s and early 1950s also
brought out hard feelings between some Catholic and Protestant leaders. See ARIENS &
DESTRO, supra note 7, at 279-80. Eleanor Roosevelt and Cardinal Spellman of New York
engaged in nasty exchanges on the propriety of federal aid to Catholic schools, and Presi-
dent Truman's decision to appoint a personal representative to the Vatican also engen-
dered inter-religious acrimony. See id.
286. See Catholicism and the Campaign, COMMONWEAL, Sept. 23, 1960, at 507. An-
other prominent Protestant leader was more open-minded on the issue. For him, the ac-
ceptability of a Catholic president would depend on whether he would seek to impose his
religious beliefs on others. See James A. Pike, A Roman Catholic in the White House?, in
CHURCH AND STATE, supra note 1, 193.
287. See Weigel, supra note 67, at 277.
288. See MURRAY, supra note 27, at 45-78. One commentator notes that a reversal of
that proposition would be a more accurate statement of Murray's intent: "Murray always
understood that the key issue was whether America was compatible with Catholic under-
standings of the human person and human community." Weigel, supra note 67, at 276.
289. See Kennedy, supra note 1.
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with Catholic thinkers like Aquinas,2'9 but according to Murray, the
guiding principles of our government actually depended on the Judeo-
Christian legacy."' And Catholicism, with its natural law groundings,
was the leading standard-bearer of that tradition. For instance, Murray
often cited the Declaration of Independence to prove that human equal-
ity and dignity were of divine origin,2'9 and he was fond of quoting Justice
Douglas's famous dictum in Zorach2 93 "We are a religious people whose
institutions presuppose a Supreme Being."' 94  Accordingly, Murray
feared that if our country lost sight of its religious heritage, its demo-
cratic, egalitarian ethos would be substantially eroded.9
Contemporary conservative interpreters of Murray thus say he was at
root a "non-preferentialist" and would have agreed with Chief Justice
Rehnquist's view 296 that the Establishment Clause only mandates equal
treatment of all religious groups, not absolute neutrality between religion
and non-religion.9 But Murray did not have it right about our country's
philosophical origins. Founders like Jefferson and Madison, with their
Enlightenment rationalism,298 probably had more in common with the Ja-
cobins than Murray would have liked to admit.299 And the Declaration of
290. See supra notes 255-57 and accompanying text.
291. See generally MURRAY, supra note 27, at 97-123.
292. See id. at 37.
293. See supra notes 114-16 and accompanying text.
294. MURRAY, supra note 27, at 30.
295. See id. at 41-43; Kenneth L. Grasso, We Held These Truths: The Transformation
of American Pluralism and the Future of American Democracy, in JOHN COURTNEY
MURRAY, supra note 9, at 89-115 (extrapolating Murray's thinking on this point to the
current day).
296. See supra notes 140-44 and accompanying text.
297. See Keith J. Pavlischek, John Courtney Murray and the American Civil Conversa-
tion, 10 J.L. & RELIGION 589 (1993-94) (book review essay); see also Gerard V. Bradley,
Beyond Murray's Articles of Peace and Faith, in JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY, supra note 9,
at 181 (arguing that Murray was an "accomodationist" on church and state issues but that
his description of the Religion Clauses as "Articles of Peace" undermined his larger theme
that the American government is underwritten by Judeo-Christian principles).
298. See Mason, supra note 241, at 149.
299. Jefferson believed that America's wartime alliance with France created a special
bond between the two countries which was deepened when the French overthrew the
monarchy and moved to a constitution. See THE FOUNDING FATHERS, THOMAS
JEFFERSON: A BIOGRAPHY IN His OWN WORDS 242 (Newsweek Books eds., 1974). In
1793, he wrote a letter defending the anticlerical Jacobins despite their turn toward a more
radical form of republicanism. See id. While deploring some of their excesses, he none-
theless hailed the Jacobins as the true representatives of French popular sentiment and
said this of his affinity for them: "My own affections have been deeply wounded by some
of the martyrs to this cause, but rather than it should have failed, I would have seen half
the earth desolated." Id. at 243; see also Michael Lienesch, Thomas Jefferson and the
Democratic Experience, in JEFFERSONIAN LEGACIES 331 (Peter S. Onuf ed., 1993).
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Independence, which Jefferson authored, is substantially copied from the
Second Treatise on Government by John Locke, a thinker who Murray
called a "decadent nominalist. '"30 Even the language "Nature's God"
and "endowed by the Creator" in the Declaration is highly ambiguous in
its theological groundings.' 1 Many see it as more the generalized prod-
uct of political compromise than the statement of a faith community.' °2
The Constitution, of course, does not mention God at all, °3 but derives
its authority from "We the People."3 °4
Some have noted the uncharacteristic nature of Justice Douglas's
statement in Zorach about our religious legacy.05 The opinion was writ-
ten in 1952, a presidential election year when Justice Douglas may well
have been harboring ambitions for higher office. 3°6 Americans, then as
well as now, are indeed a "religious people," if church membership and
professions of faith to public opinion pollsters can prove piety.3°7 Yet, for
the historical reasons just stated,08 it is hard to sustain a claim that our
institutions presuppose a Supreme Being.
The natural law tradition, although baptized by Aquinas, had its actual
beginnings, as this paper has pointed out,30 in the pre-Socratic philoso-
phers of ancient Athens and their Stoic descendants. We owe demo-
cratic thought, of course, to the Greeks,310 along with the important Aris-
totelian notion of government as a rational enterprise for the common
good." Catholics like Aquinas and the sixteenth century Jesuit Robert
Bellarmine 12 can take some credit for transmitting those foundational
300. MURRAY, supra note 27, at 309.
301. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776); see also Peter Augustine
Lawler, Murray's Natural-Law Articulation of the American Proposition, in JOHN
COURTNEY MURRAY, supra note 9, at 127.
302. See Lawler, supra note 301, at 127-28.
303. See id. at 127.
304. U.S. CONST. preamble.
305. See Frankel, supra note 19, at 636; Glendon & Yanes, supra note 3, at 535 &
n.282.
306. See Glendon & Yanes, supra note 3, at 535.
307. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
308. See supra notes 298-304 and accompanying text.
309. See supra notes 239-41, 246-48 and accompanying text.
310. The most eloquent statement of this heritage was Pericles's funeral oration re-
ported by Thucydides which extolled the democratic constitution of Athens. See
KATHLEEN FREEMAN, GOD, MAN AND THE STATE: GREEK CONCEPTS 222 (1952).
311. See supra note 245 and accompanying text.
312. See Philip Gleason, How Catholic is the Declaration of Independence? You'd Be
Surprised, COMMONWEAL, Mar. 8, 1996, at 13 (stating that Aquinas's and Bellarmine's
theories influenced English Whigs, who in turn influenced the founders of the American
republic).
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principles down to us through the Middle Ages, but they were hardly
ideas that at their origins sprung directly from religious beliefs.
Murray's more substantial legacy to contemporary Catholics, and by
extension to all Americans, is his central notion of the legitimacy of civil
government in its own right313 and his concomitant dedication to the
separation of church and state as articles of peace for a pluralistic soci-
ety. 14 This is very compatible with Everson's outlook31 that the Estab-
lishment Clause mandates neutrality, not just among religions, but be-
tween religion and non-religion. From that perspective, and the general
richness of Murray's thought, we can draw these insights for application
to contemporary issues.
VIII. THE FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION
As important as religious freedom was to Murray, he held that like all
liberty, in Cardozo's famous dictum,36 it must be ordered.317 And he fol-
lowed Aquinas in the Aristotelian tradition that emphasized reason as
the shared faculty that allows all members of a community to establish
basic moral principles for the common good.31 8 When should the right to
freely exercise one's religion override laws that are presumably based on
that consensus?
Murray's theory of the Constitution as "Articles of Peace" showed a
generous acceptance of our increasingly pluralistic nation and its varied
religious practices. And he was quite critical of naked majoritarianism, a
type of positivism that would find the ultimate warrant for law in the will
of most of the citizenry." 9 Murray at root was both a liberal and a natural
313. See supra notes 255-57 and accompanying text (discussing Murray's use of the
theories of Aquinas and Aristotle to support his belief in the independent legitimacy of
civil government).
314. See supra notes 267-75 and accompanying text.
315. See supra notes 103-10 and accompanying text.
316. See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1937) (referring to the protection
afforded by specific amendments in the Bill of Rights as "implicit in the concept of or-
dered liberty").
317. Representative are these remarks by Murray about what he called the paradox of
social freedom:
First, in society constraint must be for the sake of freedom .... The whole tex-
ture of civilization is a web of restraints, which deliver man from a host of
slaveries-to darkness, cold, and hunger; to ignorance and illness and wearisome
labors. Delivered from these base slaveries man is free to be man, to live the in-
ner life of reason and love, the classic life of wisdom, the Christian life of faith.
MURRAY, supra note 27, at 160.
318. See id. at 114-15.
319. See id. at 208.
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lawyer, supporting a democracy whose laws would not contradict certain
fundamental ethical precepts.2 As such, his theory, while quite open to
varied religious expression, would be reluctant I believe to condone cer-
tain practices that are obviously inimical to the common good or
threaten legitimate public concerns. 2 '
For instance, in Yoder the Supreme Court held that Amish parents had
a "fundamental right" to limit the formal education of their children to
less than the state's age of compulsory schooling."' For Murray, how-
ever, the self-evident value of education was so important that he called
it "[tihe great 'affair' of the commonwealth." '323  Since the religiously
based anti-intellectualism of the Amish thus ran counter to one of the
most important goods that rational beings can pursue, it is doubtful that
Murray would have supported the exemption that the Court created. It
can be surmised that he would have brought similar skepticism to Con-
gress's attempt in RFRA to demand that any law limiting religiously in-
spired practices be justified by a "compelling state interest. 324 The Act
had support from civil libertarians, but its principal sponsor was a wide
coalition of organized religions that feared a generalized hostility or in-
difference to their goals and practices."'
320. See supra notes 255-57 and accompanying text (discussing the theories of Aquinas
and Aristotle on which Murray relied).
321. One constitutional scholar expressed a viewpoint not far from this standard, stat-
ing "[t]he correct baseline ... is not unfettered religious liberty, but rather religious liberty
insofar as it is consistent with the establishment of the secular public moral order." Kath-
leen M. Sullivan, Religion and Liberal Democracy, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 195, 198 (1992); see
also supra note 283 (explaining how the Second Vatican Council cautioned against relig-
ious freedom that was not placed in the context of moral and social responsibilities).
One does not have to point to the extreme examples of the Branch Davidians or
Heaven's Gate to find shocking practices that were apparently condoned by sincerely held
religious principles. See Lundman v. McKown, 530 N.W.2d 807, 832 (Minn. Ct. App.
1995) (upholding an award of compensatory damages in a wrongful death action against a
mother of the Christian Science faith who refused conventional medical treatment for her
11-year-old daughter), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 828 (1996); see also William Dowell, Her
Dying Prayers, TIME, May 5, 1997, at 66 (describing the recent criminal conviction of par-
ents who refused conventional medical treatment on religious grounds for their 16-year-
old daughter who died of a diabetic coma). But see In re Dubreuil, 629 So. 2d 819, 820
(Fla. 1993) (upholding the right of a woman of the Jehovah's Witnesses faith to refuse a
blood transfusion to save her life despite the fact that she was the mother of three children
ages twelve, six, and four).
322. See supra notes 128-33 and accompanying text.
323. MURRAY, supra note 27, at 9.
324. See supra notes 199-203 and accompanying text.
325. See Robert F. Drinan, Religious Freedom: Congress and the Courts, AMERICA,
Feb. 15, 1997, at 7.
326. See Robert A. Destro, "By What Right?": The Sources and Limits of Federal
Court and Congressional Jurisdiction Over Matters "Touching Religion," 29 IND. L. REV. 1
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Any concern that certain religious activities may not be rationally de-
fensible would be outside Murray's Catholic tradition which always up-
held the affinity of humanism and Christian faith.327 Religion is rightly
afforded a special status in the Constitution. But as the Court stated in
Boerne when it struck down RFRA, if believers were given broad power
to exempt themselves from neutral, generally applicable laws that further
the common good, government would have a difficult time achieving its
legitimate goals.328
IX. RELIGIOUSLY INSPIRED LAWS AND POLITICAL ACTIVITY
But what of the right of individuals and religious organizations to par-
ticipate in the political process by advocating views that are grounded by
their faith? Two leading constitutional commentators, Michael Perry329
and Kent Greenawalt, 30 have argued that the rights of those citizens
should not be circumscribed by the source of their convictions. This ar-
gument would seem to be in keeping with other First Amendment guar-
antees concerning freedom of expression. It would also be unrealistic to
force individuals to dichotomize their personalities in a way that would
closet their religious inspiration.331
In addition, religious views and religiously inspired language can con-
tribute vital support to endeavors that are amply justified by humanistic
332
concern. Particularly a propos here are certain scripturally rooted be-
liefs that are prominent in Catholic thought, such as the notion that all
humans are made in God's image.333 Many advances in human dignity
and civil rights have been animated by that belief because it rings so true,
I believe, with an aspiration that is universal in the human heart.
In their political advocacy, however, it would be prudent for church
leaders to also support such religiously motivated messages with sound
policy arguments. Such an approach should be no problem for Catholics
(1995) (supporting RFRA); Douglas Laycock & Oliver S. Thomas, Interpreting the Relig-
ious Freedom Restoration Act, 73 TEx. L. REV. 209, 216-17 (1994) (supporting RFRA be-
cause the Supreme Court's existing jurisprudence under the Smith case undermined the
guaranty of the Free Exercise Clause). But cf Thomas C. Berg, What Hath Congress
Wrought? An Interpretive Guide to the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 39 VILL. L.
REV. 1 (1994) (urging moderation in the interpretation of RFRA).
327. See supra notes 225-26 and accompanying text.
328. See supra notes 204-10 and accompanying text.
329. See MICHAELJ. PERRY, MORALITY, POLITICS, AND LAW (1988).
330. See KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS AND POLITICAL CHOICE
(1988).
331. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
332. See Tracy, supra note 12, at 197.
333. See Genesis 1:26; cf Galatians 3:27-28.
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who hold to Aquinas's bedrock belief that grace builds on nature.334
Similarly, the much maligned Lemon test, which requires that every law
have a valid secular purpose,335 is important here to guarantee the auton-
omy of political authority.36
X. STATE AID TO RELIGIOUS SCHOOLS
For some time, many Catholics, particularly most of those who send
their children to church-run schools, have felt aggrieved by decisions that
make it very difficult for the government to grant direct financial aid to
those institutions.337 Murray himself sounded this theme, arguing that de-
nial of state aid to religious schools was unjust because it did not recog-
nize the diverse educational needs of a pluralistic society.3s To support
his position, he cited comments by Justice Douglas in Zorach that the
government should "respect[] the religious nature of our people and ac-
commodate[] the public service to their spiritual needs.,
339
Reflecting on the American Jewish experience, Stephen Feldman has
recently made a similar point from a post-modern perspective. Ac-
cording to Feldman, the Supreme Court's failure to condone the creation
of a separate school district so that federal funds could be allocated to
the needs of handicapped Hasidic children341 was nothing more than the
dominant culture's refusal to give equal validity to the Jewish religion.
Catholic leaders felt similarly put upon when the Court ruled in the
334. See THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE 307-24 (Timothy McDermott ed.,
1989). It is interesting that in the Summa, Aquinas's great work, his section on grace fol-
lows the section on law. For Aquinas, both are divine influences on human action, "God
stimulating us to do good, teaching us by law and aiding us by grace." Id. at 276. And it
follows that grace builds on nature because moral principles, Aquinas's natural law, come
from human reason. See supra note 257 and accompanying text.
335. See supra notes 122-24 and accompanying text.
336. See supra notes 255-57 and accompanying text. Michael Perry, a leading Catholic
jurist, has recently stated that: "[G]overnment [may] not make [certain] political
choices.., unless a plausible secular rationale supports the choice without help from a
parallel religious argument." MICHAEL J. PERRY, RELIGION IN POLITICS:
CONSTITUTIONAL AND MORAL PERSPECTIVES 34 (1997).
337. See supra notes 117-27 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court's
Establishment Clause jurisprudence with respect to public schools).
338. See MURRAY, supra note 27, at 143-54.
339. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952).
340. See Stephen M. Feldman, Principle, History, and Power: The Limits of the First
Amendment Religion Clauses, 81 IOWA L. REV. 833, 872-73 (1996).
341. See supra notes 166-67 and accompanying text.
342. See Feldman, supra note 340, at 873.
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Aguilar case 3' that federally funded programs for disadvantaged children
could not be operated in parochial schools.
44
Yet Catholic education is today enjoying substantial indirect govern-
mental aid through decisions like Mueller which condone the tax de-
ductibility of contributions to religious organizations that maintain
schools. 45 And the Court's recent reversal of Aguilar in Agostini seems
to solidify a trend where the Court is willing to condone governmental
grants to individuals for use in either public or religiously affiliated
schools if they are administered on a non-sectarian basis.346
With such judicial willingness to condone some government support to
those attending religiously affiliated schools, a good approach might now
be to admit that direct state aid is undesirable. 4 ' Despite Murray's ex-
plicit opinion to the contrary, other aspects of his outlook point that way.
He saw the Establishment Clause as having an important role in safe-
guarding religious freedom and described it approvingly as a self-denying
ordinance3 48 where the government bluntly prohibited itself from acting
in furtherance of religion.
Decisions which do not allow direct state support of institutions pro-
moting religion thus preserve the important principle of governmental
neutrality toward belief.34 9 In the long run, this guarantees that Catholics,
as well as others, may enjoy the liberty to practice their faith as they see
fit.
343. See supra notes 126-27.
344. See Chopko, supra note 3, at 1149-51 (discussing the Aguilar case in detail).
345. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
346. See supra notes 176-83.
347. The Agostini decision has raised renewed speculation about the constitutionality
of certain "voucher" plans where students choose to enroll in either a public or private
school and the government pays part of the tuition to the school. The Wisconsin Supreme
Court upheld this type of program in Davis v. Grover, 480 N.W.2d 460, 477 (Wis. 1992),
when it excluded religiously affiliated schools from a state school choice program. Like-
wise, a federal district court ruled that this same school choice program could not include
religiously affiliated schools. See Miller v. Benson, 878 F. Supp. 1209, 1216 (E.D. Wis.),
vacated as moot 68 F.3d 163 (7th Cir. 1995).
A similar program in Ohio that provided parents with checks that could be endorsed to
religiously affiliated schools was also declared unconstitutional. See Simmons-Harris v.
Goff, Nos. 96APE08-982, 96APE08-991, 1997 WL 217583, at *15 (Ohio App. May 1,
1997). The court ruled that this program provided direct and substantial government aid
to sectarian schools. See id. at *10.
348. See MURRAY, supra note 27, at 69.
349. From that perspective, the reasoning of Everson is still fundamentally sound. See
supra notes 103-10 and accompanying text.
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XI. CLOSING THE HERMENEUTIC CIRCLE
The contemporary German philosopher Hans Gadamer has insight-
fully described the process of textual interpretation as "the interplay of
the movement of tradition and the movement of the interpreter. '"35 In
that spirit may I close by offering an explanation of the religion clauses
drawn from the intent of one of their framers who precedes me in the
Catholic tradition.
Legislative history of congressional deliberations on the religion
clauses is sparse, but here is a summary of the comments made at that
time by Congressman Daniel Carroll of Maryland, one of only two
Catholics to sign the Constitution,"' and one of only two non-Protestants
in the First Congress:352
Mr. CARROLL.-As the rights of conscience are, in their na-
ture, of peculiar delicacy, and will little bear the gentlest touch
of governmental hand; and as many sects have concurred in
opinion that they are not well secured under the present Consti-
tution, he said he was much in favor of adopting the words. He
thought it would tend more towards conciliating the minds of
the people to the Government than almost any other amend-
ment he had heard proposed. He would not contend with the
gentlemen about the phraseology, his object was to secure the
substance in such a manner as to satisfy the wishes of the honest
part of the community."
As is clear from his comments, Congressman Carroll was not inter-
ested in quibbling over the First Amendment's language. His broader,
practical concern was to make sure that the government of the new na-
tion was going to keep its hands off religious matters. He came from a
state that had been founded as a Catholic colony in the 1630s and whose
early laws proclaimed religious tolerance, at least for Christians.354 By
the late seventeenth century, however, Maryland had become dominated
350. HANs-GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD 293 (2d ed. 1989); cf. RAKOVE,
supra note 212, at xv n.*. Rakove, tongue in cheek, may have the true insight here. After
his discussion of the perils of divining and applying the intent of the Constitution's framers
to contemporary issues, he adds: "On the other hand, I happen to like originalist argu-
ments when the weight of the evidence seems to support the constitutional outcomes I fa-
vor-and that may be as good a clue to the appeal of originalism as any other." Id.
351. See THE STORY OF CATHOLICS IN AMERICA 16 (Don Brophy & Edythe
Westenhaver eds., 1978).
352. See McConnell, supra note 77, at 136.
353. ARIENS& DESTRO, supra note 7, at 80 (citing 1 Annals of Congress 729-31).
354. See DOLAN, supra note 17, at 76-77.
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by Puritans who placed severe restrictions on the practice of the Catholic
faith.355
Maryland Catholics had regained political power after the revolution
and many were elected to the new state's assembly in 1784-85."' At that
time, legislation similar to that proposed in Virginia, which would have
provided tax-funded support of all religions, was also offered in Mary-
land.357 Madison and Jefferson successfully opposed that initiative in
Virginia 8 And the Catholic delegates in Maryland did the same, fearing
that such public funding would be the beginning of the establishment of
the Protestant Episcopal Church in their state.35 9 Their opposition was
instrumental in the legislation's defeat.3 6
With that background, it is hard to see how Congressman Carroll could
have supported an Amendment that only guaranteed neutrality among
denominations while allowing the government to act preferentially for
religion in general. The national faith that would arise from such an ar-
rangement would be Protestant and from their early history of persecu-
tion Congressman Carroll must have known that his Catholic constitu-
ents could only really thrive in an America where the functions of
government and religion were strictly separated.
As this article has shown, Carroll's support of the Amendment was
prescient in that regard. It constituted the consent of a proto-minority-
one that with some struggle would lead the way in demonstrating that
America could offer the opportunity for human fulfillment to people of
all beliefs. The Catholic experience would thus confirm Madison's re-
markable insight-that full freedom of religion is essential to the promise
of equal citizenship.36
355. Among other things, Catholics were forbidden to worship in public and, in 1718,
they were stripped of their right to vote and hold public office. See id. at 84-85.
356. See id. at 109.
357. See id.
358. See supra note 271 and accompanying text.
359. See DOLAN, supra note 17, at 109; see also supra note 271 and accompanying text.
360. See DOLAN, supra note 17, at 109.
361. See supra notes 270-71 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 232-48, 332-33
and accompanying text (discussing the religious and philosophical roots of that humanistic
egalitarianism).
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